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I. Introduction
A. The Rise ofInstitution Building and Business Formalizationin
InternationalDevelopment
Past the midpoint of its first term, the Obama administration has
revealed relatively little about its Africa policy. One priority, however,
seems clear: the administration believes that healthy, high-functioning
institutions are vital to the future stability and prosperity of African
nations.' President Obama's speech in Accra, Ghana on July 11, 2009one of the administration's few important declarations on Africamentioned institutions five separate times, 2 including the quotable
admonition that "Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong
institutions." 3 According to the President, "[i]n the 21st century,
capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success."'
When the President specified the institutions to which he was referring,
there was a distinct legal tint, including parliaments, police forces, and
judiciaries.'
A survey of U.S.-funded aid programs indicates that the focus on
institution building is more than mere rhetoric. A surfeit of U.S.-funded
programs aim to build rational, predictable institutions, with a particular
emphasis on institutions that will stimulate commercial development in
1. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President to the Ghanaian Parliament, para. 22 (July 11, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
press _office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament.
2. Id. paras. 3, 22, 25, 26, 51.
3. Id. para. 25.
4. Id. para. 22.
5. See id. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also mentioned institutions in a major
address at the 8th Forum of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, stating that, "Citizens and
governments need to work together to build and sustain strong democratic institutions." Hillary
Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks at the 8th Forum of the African Growth and
Opportunity Act, para. 34 (Aug. 5, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2009a/08/126902.htm).
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poor countries.6 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a
relatively new and increasingly important U.S. aid organization, 7 and
the more venerable U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), are initiating programs in poor countries throughout Africa
and the developing world based on the assumption that the future
stability and prosperity of these countries depends on unleashing and
guiding the entrepreneurial spirit of small enterprises, and that this can
be accomplished by improving the institutions-most notably the laws
and legal enforcement mechanisms-that regulate them.9 The new wave
of aid programs aims to remove burdensome, bureaucratic institutions
laden with red tape and introduce streamlined, predictable, businessfacilitative institutions that will lend support and structure to poor
countries' commercial sectors.10
According to this view, which has been heavily influenced by the
scholarly works of the Peruvian political scientist Hernando De Soto
and the American economist Douglass North," entrepreneurs in
6.

See JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., LAND AND BUSINESS

FORMALIZATION FOR LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: STRATEGIC OVERVIEW PAPER 7

(2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADIO80.pdf. See also Jeffrey Gettleman,
Kenya's Volatile Politics Shadow Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/world/africa/06diplo.html (paraphrasing U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton as saying that the new U.S. approach to aid to Africa would include the
goal of bolstering support for African entrepreneurs).
7. See Doug Johnson & Tristan Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentivefor Good
Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 1 (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 11, 2006), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/
ezp site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/cid/publications/student-fellows/
wp/01 1.pdf) (referring to the creation of the MCC as the most significant shift in U.S. foreign
aid policy since the creation of USAID in 1961).
8. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 2 (noting that formalization programs include
improved opportunities "designed to assist small and newly-formalized operations. . . ."); see
also Judi Hudson, Why Regulations Matter: A Small Business Perspective, in REGULATING
DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 223, 238 (Edmund Amann ed.,
2006) [hereinafter REGULATING DEVELOPMENT] (commenting that small and medium-sized

enterprises, or SMEs, are vital drivers of economic growth in developing countries).
9. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 7-8; see also Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse,
Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1095, 1096 (2007) (referring to a recent "surge of interest" in the role of "institutions" in
determining economic outcomes, particularly in the developing world).
10. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. See also Mary M. Shirley, Institutions and
Development, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 611 (Claude M6nard & Mary

M. Shirley eds., 2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (attributing underdeveloped countries to "weak,
missing or perverse institutions . . . .").
11. See discussion infra Part II.A (detailing De Soto's and North's work and its influence
on U.S. aid policy); see generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO,

THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL] (postulating the economic success of the West is rooted in a

transformation from an informal, extralegal property system to a formal and legal property
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developing countries often choose to operate their businesses in the
informal sector of their countries' economies in order to avoid
confusing, burdensome governmental regulations and taxation.12 By
seeking refuge in the informal sector, entrepreneurs avoid the grasping
hand of government, but in the long run they harm themselves and their
countries' economies. They harm themselves by limiting their ability to
access expansion capital, by compelling themselves to keep their
enterprises unnaturally small to avoid scrutiny by governmental actors,
and by preventing themselves from gaining standing to initiate formal
legal actions if they have disputes with other business people.' 3 They
harm their societies by failing to pay taxes, failing to follow
employment safety and welfare regulations, and failing to grow their
businesses to optimum efficiency, create employment, and buoy the
overall economy.
The development experts' implicit assumption is that those who
remain in the informal sector live in a Hobbesian world where there are
few predictable rules and little is secure. No rational entrepreneur would
intensify his or her investments under these conditions, nor would an
outsider wish to invest his capital, and this is why businesses in the
developing world tend to remain comparatively unproductive and
foreign direct investment is constrained.' 5
system); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD

WORLD (1989) [hereinafter DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH] (discussing the informal economies in
Peru and facilitating economic development with formal institutions); Douglass C. North,
Institutions and the Performance of Economies Over Time, in HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 21
(discussing the role institutions play in economic change); Douglass C. North, Economic
Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 359 (1994) (discussing the role of institutions
in Improving economic performance over time).
12.

See EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM RATLIFF, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 4-5 (2000) (discussing De Soto's and North's research that suggests the reasons
people use the informal sector of an economy). See also BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 8, 15
(indicating a majority of business conducted in sub-Saharan Africa takes place in the informal
sector).
13. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 28-29 (noting the benefits businesses forego by
operating in the informal sector).
14. See id. at 7 (discussing the link between informality and poverty). See generally DEV.
ALTERNATIVES, INC. & BANNOCK CONSULTING LTD., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., REMOVING
BARRIERS TO FORMALIZATION: THE CASE FOR REFORM AND EMERGING BEST PRACTICE 4 (2005)

[hereinafter USAID REMOVING BARRIERS REPORT), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

36/27/38452590.pdf (listing several reasons for seeking to reduce the informal sector of an
economy); Paul H. Rubin, Legal Systems as Frameworksfor Market Exchanges, in HANDBOOK,
supra note 10, at 210-11 (arguing institutional and legal uncertainty in countries' business
sectors leads to economic inefficiency and lack of growth).
15. See Thomas Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in Niger:
Harming Contemporary Slaves by Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 999, 100102 (2008) (discussing the theory that a lack of secure property rights results in an investment

climate that is risky).
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The obvious policy solution to these problems is to replace bad
institutions with good ones: to pass laws and regulations that are simple
to understand and comply with and that unambiguously protect
entrepreneurs' property and contract rights, along with legal
enforcement mechanisms that are accessible, efficient, and
inexpensive.16 With the introduction of these improved institutions,
entrepreneurs will flock toward the formal sector, and all will be well.
Accordingly, Western-funded business formalization programs have
focused on simplifying the process of registering new businesses,
rewriting business and investment codes to enshrine secure property
rights and laissez-faire, free-market liberal economic principles, and
shoring up the justice systems that will enforce all of these newly
enshrined rational rules.17
The issue of corruption plays a role in the stor told by proponents
of institution building and business formalization. In brief, one of the
reasons that typical, complex business regulations in developing
countries are so vexing to entrepreneurs is that each bend in the tortuous
regulatory path creates a bottleneck where corrupt governmental
officials can extract bribes--or rents, as economists call them.19 If the
entrepreneur does not offer a bribe to the petty official, the official will
not issue the permit necessary to conduct or expand the entrepreneur's
business. The existence of such petty corruption and the inefficiency it
causes provides yet more reasons to improve the country's institutions
by simplifying its regulatory and legal structure and improving its law

16. See Hossein Jalilian et al., Creating the Conditions for International Business
Expansion: The Impact ofRegulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries-A CrossCountry Analysis, in REGULATING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 15-16 (suggesting the proper
institutions and the proper rules can foster beneficial market activity). See also BUSCAGLIA &
RATLIFF, supra note 12, at 1-2.
17. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2007: How To REFORM 1-2 (2007)
[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS REPORT 2007], available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/
media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DBO7-FullReport.pdf
18. See USAID REMOVING BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 18.
19. See id. (discussing the extent to which small businesses are hampered by rampant
bribery, especially where it is decentralized); see also THE WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 44611NE, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PROGRAM DOCUMENT FOR A PROPOSED
GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT I (GPRG- 1) TO THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR
26.5 MILLION (US $40 MILLION EQUIVALENT) 1-2 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD BANK NIGER
GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT], http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default
/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/03/27/000350881_20090327100827/Rendered/PDF/44611
OPGDOIDAlll1 20ADDENDUMO 1PUBLIC 1.pdf (referring to the importance of removing
bureaucratic bottlenecks); Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and

Government Expenditure: A Cross-country Analysis, The Globalization of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 85 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1996) (employing the
term "rent seeking" to describe the solicitation of bribes).
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enforcement mechanisms.2 0
The thesis of this Article, which is based largely on fieldwork
performed among the owners of small business enterprises in the West
African Republic of Niger, is that development experts who focus on
institution building-business formalization programs in particular-are
mistaken in two of their assumptions. First, it is not true that the socalled informal sector lacks rules and consistent, predictable
institutions. Second, and very much related, when it comes to
formalizing the business sector, corruption is more than an annoyance
or an additional drag on a structurally dysfunctional system. In fact, it is
the system. Corruption is so engrained in the culture of Nigerien
society, including its business sector, that at present it supplies the logic
and the rules that most businessmen live by. Stated in the terminology
of New Institutional Economics, which provides a theoretical
foundation for business formalization programs and which will be
explored in Part II, corruption is the primary institution that provides the
rules of the game for Niger's business sector.
For those promoting institution building and business formalization
as the medicine for what ails the developing world, this means that the
task of growing the formal sector is even more challenging than
advertised. It is not simply a matter of creating predictable institutions
and then inviting entrepreneurs to abandon their Hobbesian struggle in
favor of a rational, predictable business environment. Rather, the task is
to convince a broad array of actors in the business sector, and other
sectors of society, that they will be better off if they abandon one
engrained institution and one set of rules--corruption-in favor of
another-the Western ideal of a lightly and rationally regulated market.
B. Project Methodology
At this project's genesis, my aim was to understand institution
building-in particular, business formalization-as a strategy of
international development by studying a country where such aid
programs were being implemented. I subscribe to the notion that when
designing law reform programs for developing countries, and when
evaluating or studying those programs, one cannot hope to succeed
without thoroughly understanding the law, legal system, and culture of
the country that is to be reformed, and that the only way to do that is to
actually spend time there.21 Indeed, in the past I have critiqued law and
20. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that corruption in the formal sector
dissuades informal businesses from formalizing); see also USAID REMOVING BARRIERS
REPORT, supra note 14, at 18 (noting businesses are less likely to formalize operations in a
corrupt environment and noting evidence when corruption decreases, formalization increases).
21. See Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy, The Legal Empowerment
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development projects in Africa as either ineffective or inadvertently
harmful because they were designed and implemented by people who
lacked sufficient understanding of the societies they were attempting to
f22
reform.
Studying business in a country such as Niger poses unique
methodological challenges. My aim was to develop an understanding of
small businesses in Niger and the institutional framework in which
those businesses operate, paying particular heed to entrepreneurs'
incentives and disincentives to operate in the country's formal sector.
Armed with an on-the-ground, practical understanding of how Nigerien
entrepreneurs operate, I intended to comment on whether the new
business formalization programs, which were designed by economists
with little specific knowledge of Niger, were hitting their mark; that is,
whether they were addressing and remedying institutional shortcomings
that Nigerien entrepreneurs were actually concerned with.
As in past law and development projects, my methodology was
essentially ethnographic. I performed forty interviews, mostly with
owners of small enterprises, mostly semi-structured and one-on-one. I
asked them how they started and grew their businesses, what their plans
were for the future and how Niger's legal and regulatory environment
helped or hindered their plans.23
The interviews produced surprising information. Based on past study
of Niger, I hypothesized that familial, ethnic, and Islamic religious
networks were more extensive and efficacious than aid experts
assumed, that in combination they provided an adequate institutional
framework for Nigerien commerce,2 4 and that this explains why
Alternative 24-25 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 41, 2003)
(encouraging law reform experts to spend more time in the countries they are trying to reform).
22. See generally Kelley, supra note 15 (arguing, based on the author's ethnographic
fieldwork, that anti-slavery law reform efforts introduced by Western countries unintentionally
harmed Niger's contemporary slaves).
23. It bears mentioning that my qualitative methodology for the study of law and
development is unfashionable. For at least the past decade, scholarship on international
development has been dominated by economists and lawyers who subscribe to a law and
economics view of the world. Broadly speaking, these scholars tend to discount the value of any
knowledge that cannot be expressed quantitatively, verified scientifically, and summarized in a
chart or a Venn diagram. See UGO MATTEl & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW

IS ILLEGAL 48-49, 94 (2008) (discussing the predominance of economists, their insistence on
"scientific study" and their predilection for graphs); see also MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP.,
GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS AND THE SELECTION PROCESS: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008), http://

(mentionmauritania.usembassy.gov/uploads/DJ/wn/DJwnMBPt6qVzzLeqlNQgcg/mccen.pdf
ing the MCC's insistence on objective data and analytically rigorous methodology); Johnson &
Zajonc, supra note 7, at 10-14 (describing the MCC's empirical approach to evaluating
international development programs); Davis & Kruse, supra note 9, at 1096 (noting that the
study of law and development has been dominated by non-lawyers).
24. This hypothesis was based partly on what I had casually observed in Niger and partly
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business formalization efforts were having trouble gaining traction.
What I discovered was that those informal networks do exist and do
facilitate commerce, but that the essential institution setting the rules of
the game was corruption.
This led to a further methodological challenge, which is that
businessmen 25 are reluctant to discuss corruption. 26 It is after all, illegal
even if it is an essential aspect of commerce in Niger. The upshot of
these methodological challenges was that I was able to conduct fewer
on literature I reviewed before traveling there to perform fieldwork for this project. See, e.g.,
Robert B. Charlick, Niger: Islamist Identity and the Politics of Globalization, in POLITICAL
ISLAM INWEST AFRICA 19-20, 39 (William F.S. Miles ed., 2007) (arguing that conservative
Islamic networks give structure to the business sector in the Nigerien city of Maradi and are
emerging as a popular alternative to Western market capitalism among young businessmen);
EMMANUEL GREGOIRE, THE ALHAZAI OF MARADI: TRADITIONAL HAUSA MERCHANTS IN A
CHANGING SAHELIAN CITY 167-69 (Benjamin H. Hardy ed. & trans., rev. ed. 1992) (arguing a
traditional social structure undergirds modern commercial structures); ABNER COHEN, CUSTOM
AND POLITICS INURBAN AFRICA, A STUDY OF HAUSA MIGRANTS INYORUBA TOWNS 6-25 (1969)
(describing ties of religion and ethnicity among African businessmen); JANET MACGAFFEY &
REMY BAZENGUISSA-GANGA, CONGO-PARIS: TRANSNATIONAL TRADERS ON THE MARGINS OF THE
LAW (2000) (describing reliance on ties of family, friendship, and ethnicity among African
traders); see also USAID REMOVING BARRIERS REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-19 (mentioning

that sociocultural factors such as networks of trust and interdependence can hinder
formalization).
25. I use this gendered term because, in fact, all my interview subjects were men.
Although women are well represented in the ranks of micro-entrepreneurs, often selling
prepared foods on the street or spices in the market, based on my observations, comparatively
few are owners of small or medium-sized enterprises. The gender skewed sample is doubtless
also due to the fact that I relied on "snowball sampling" to identify interview subjects. Because
Niger is patriarchal and Islamic, most of my social and professional contacts are male. They, in
turn, tend to introduce and recommend me to interview other males. Throughout this Article, I
refer to "businessmen" and "entrepreneurs" interchangeably.
26. See Giorgio Blundo & Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Why Should We Study Everyday
Corruptionand How Should We Go About It? [hereinafter Blundo & de Sardan], in EVERYDAY
CORRUPTION AND THE STATE: CITIZENS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS INAFRICA 3, 9 (Giorgio Blundo et
al. eds., Susan Cox trans., 2006) [hereinafter EVERYDAY CORRUPTION]; see also Susan RoseAckerman, Introduction and Overview [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman], in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION xiv, xxxi (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK]; see Interview with Owner of Several Small
Businesses, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter First Interview with Owner] (on file
with author) (offering to describe the advantages of operating in the informal sector but then
repeatedly avoiding the discussion). In recognition of the delicate nature of conversations about
corruption, this Article avoids naming interview subjects, instead referring to them by a
descriptive moniker.
27. Interview with Former Director General of a Private Radio Station, in Niamey, Niger
(Feb. 26, 2009) (on file with author) (noting many newspapers and radio stations in Niger
engage in corruption). Based on my knowledge from doing work in the field, in addition to the
illegality, Nigerien businesses are generally reluctant to discuss their enterprises because the
more their friends and family members know about their businesses' profitability, the more
likely they are to ask for support.
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in-depth interviews than I had hoped during my month of fieldwork,28
and I suspected that at least a few of my interview subjects were less
than candid about how they operate or, in the case of governmental
officials, regulate businesses.2 9
C. The Roadmap
Part II of this Article reviews the theory and practice of institution
building and business formalization programs, focusing particular
attention on the role that New Institutional Economics has played in
giving shape to U.S.-funded international law and development
programs. Part III describes the business formalization programs that
have been implemented in Niger, and takes the additional step-one
often skipped by law and development experts-of describing the
practices and concerns of Nigerien businessmen. 3 1 Because an
exploration of Niger's small business sector revealed that corruption is a
vitally important institution, Part IV provides a brief primer on
corruption, explaining its various definitions and exploring competing
explanations of its causes and consequences.32 Part V narrows the focus
to corruption in Niger and will illustrate how it has emerged as the
primary institution giving shape to Niger's business sector.3 3 This
Article concludes in Part VI with the modest observation that Western
aid organizations and the lawyers and economists who populate them
must, if they are to be effective, alter their conception of corruption and
the role it plays in the business sectors of poor countries such as
Niger. 34 Stated bluntly, those Western aid experts must shed the notion
that corruption is an inefficient drag on the system, and face the fact that
it is the system.
II. INSTITUTION BUILDING AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. TheoreticalFoundations
Tracing the theoretical roots of contemporary business formalization
28.
29.
agency,
Nigerien
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

I planned to perform no fewer than fifty interviews during my month of fieldwork.
In an interview with a Nigerien Customs Official working for a notoriously corrupt
the official disclaimed all knowledge of his agency's corruption. Interview with
Customs Official, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part Ill.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part VI.
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programs in a few paragraphs is a daunting task, particularly for one
who is not inclined toward the discipline of economics. As is true of
many discussions of Western economic principles, this one begins with
Adam Smith and the Wealth ofNations, which taught that governmental
regulation and central planning were not necessary to bring order to
economic systems because the Invisible Hand of supply and demand
and competitive pricing would always accomplish the task more
effectively. 3
In the 1960s, the renowned economist Ronald Coase generated two
important insights that added nuance to Adam Smith's Invisible Hand
theory, insights that have a formative influence on today's business
formalization programs.3 6 Coase argued that Adam Smith's intellectual
heirs-with their laser-like focus on pricing as a regulatory mechanism
and their unshakeable assumption that the world was inhabited by
atomized utility-maximizers-ignored the fact that firms play a vital
role in creating economic efficiency. 37 Coase believed there were costs
associated with relying on the pricing mechanism. 38 For example, the
individual participant in the market had to investigate and negotiate
prices, and once those prices were determined, had to enforce them by
entering into contracts.39 When those contracts failed, the individuals
were forced to seek the intervention of courts and other dispute
resolution mechanisms. 40 All of these necessary steps to participation in
the market created what Coase termed "transaction costs." 4 ' In his view,
firms formed naturally as a means of reducing transaction costs and
creating greater efficiency. 42
Coase also argued that what is traded in the open market are not so
much physical things as rights to perform actions in relation to those
things.4 3 He believed that the contours of those rights were determined
by a given society's legal system and, logically therefore, that the

35. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The InstitutionalStructure of Production, in HANDBOOK,
supra note 10, at 31-32.
36. KoFI OTENG KUFOUR, THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE EcoNOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 2-3 (2006) (arguing Coase's novel ideas were at the root

of New Institutional Economics).
37. Id.
38. See Coase, supra note 35, at 34 (discussing Coase's own initial realization of these
costs in 1932).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. As Coase noted, "It was the avoidance of the costs of carrying out transactions
through the market that could explain the existence of the firm in which the allocation of factors
came about as a result of administrative decisions . . . ."). Id.
42. See id at 33-34.
43. Id. at 37.
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society's legal system had a profound effect on its economy." He
asserted that as a matter of sound economic policy, legal systems should
operate in such a way that rights could be assigned to those market
actors who would use them most productively and efficiently. 45 Stated
otherwise, an economically efficient society's legal system should
ensure that the costs of transferring economic rights are low so that they
can be expeditiously transferred to their most efficient users. The
upshot, according to Coase and his intellectual progeny, is that laws,
particularly those governing the negotiation and enforcement of
contracts and the protection of property rights resulting from such
contracts, must be clear, simple and strong.4 6
Building upon Coase's insights about the importance of firms and
transaction costs, the work of the American economist Douglass North
highlights the vital role that institutions play in efficiently regulating
economies. North defined institutions broadly as "humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction,"47 including the legal
systems that Coase thought so vital, but also including less formal nonstate social networks and norms.4 8 Together, the formal and informal
institutions define the "rules of the game" for the economy and "the
way the game is played."4 9
In the oversimplified version of North's work that often appears in
action plans and project reports drafted by international aid
organizations, good institutions, most particularly good laws and legal
enforcement mechanisms that facilitate contracts and protect property
rights, lead to strong economies.o Weak institutions, most notably laws,
regulatory bodies and law enforcement mechanisms that are confusing,
laden with red tape, and corrupt, lead to weak economies. 5 The key to
successful economic transformation, and ultimately to socio-economic
development, is therefore to replace bad institutions with good ones.
When international aid agencies apply North's institutional
theories-often referred to by the moniker New Institutional Economics
(NIE)-they tend to ignore the fact that his writings consistently

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
359, 360 (1994).
48. See Douglass C. North, Institutionsand the PerformanceofEconomies Over Time, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 22.

49.
50.

Id.
See generally BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 7-9 (discussing the need for institutional

reform and citing explicitly to Douglass North's work); DOING BUSINESS REPORT 2007, supra

note 17, at 1-7 (laying out an overly simplistic version of institutional reform).
51. See generally DOING BUSINESS REPORT 2007, supra note 17, at 1-7.
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emphasize the arduous, incremental nature of institutional change. He
writes that individuals and organizations invariably exist within an
institutional matrix, the logic of which is determined by the society's
history and norms and based upon the exPeriences and belief systems of
the individuals who make up the society. The interwoven nature of the
society's institutional matrix creates a path dependency that largely
determines the shape that future institutions will take and from which it
is extremely difficult to break free.5 4 Most policy reform interventions
aimed at a society's institutions focus only on its formal laws and
regulations, and are often ineffective due to path dependency and
because so many institutions are informal rather than formal.s
The focus of Coase and North and their intellectual descendants on
the importance of consistent property rights and the necessity of
institutional reform was echoed and amplified by the Peruvian social
scientist, Hernando De Soto, who, perhaps to an even greater extent
than Coase and North, has become the guiding intellectual light of the
56
new wave of institutionalists, including business formalizers.
According to De Soto, poor countries can rise with the economic tide of
globalization and grow their way out of poverty if and only if they
reform their regulatory institutions to eliminate or at least reduce the
unnecessary red tape that creates insuperable "barriers to entry" for
would-be entrepreneurs.57 Those entrepreneurs, understandably daunted
by unnecessarily complex regulatory and legal requirements, simply
avoid the mess (described by Coase and North as "transaction costs") by
conducting their businesses underground in the informal sector.5 8 This
in turn has a deleterious effect, not only on the entrepreneurs' prospects
for economic growth, but on the country's overall economy. 59
Because the entrepreneur chooses to operate in the informal sector,
he has no secure rights or title to his own assets and therefore cannot
convert those assets into productive capital. 60 He cannot pledge his
52.
53.
54.
55.
abruptly
56.

See North, supranote 48, at 24.
Id. at 23-24.
Id.
See id. at 27-28 (expressing disdain for simplistic development nostrums that seek to
change developing countries' institutional frameworks).
See generally DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 11. See also THE

WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 34-

38 (2001), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2000/12/13/000094946_99092312334240/Rendered/PDF/multi.page.pdf (citing De
Soto regarding the importance of secure property rights and formal land titles).
57.

See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 11, at 30.

58. See id.at 21.
59. See id. at 21, 30-32.
60. See id. at 40, 52-54 (comparing the West's formalized property system with Third
World countries' lack of a formalized property system).
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business or his office building as collateral for a loan to expand because,
in the eyes of the law and necessarily in the eyes of the institutional
lender, his business does not exist.61 Without a formal legal existence,
and in the broader context of an unpredictable and inconsistent
institutional framework, intensification of investment by the
entrepreneur himself or any investment by outside sources of capital is
unacceptably risky. 62 Consistent with NIE scholars, the solution to the
problem that De Soto describes is to establish better institutions,
particularly those that rationalize and protect private property, allowing
property owners to revive their "dead" capital and generate surplus
value from their assets.6 3
B. New InstitutionalismDisplaces the Washington Consensus as a
GuidingForce in InternationalDevelopment
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NIE was still gestating as an
economic theory and had not yet been adopted as a lodestar for
international law and development experts. In fact, the development
game during the 1990s-influenced by the West's victory in the Cold
War and its assumption that free-market capitalism had caused it to
prevail-focused on eliminating governmental institutions in poor
countries, or at least paring them back to the bare minimum, so that
unregulated markets could work their magic. 64 By the dawn of the new
millennium, when it became clear that the aggressive deregulation
espoused by Western governments (the general deregulation and
liberalization program was often referred to as the Washington
Consensus 6 5 ) was not improving conditions in the developing world,6 6 a
new development consensus began to take shape, based in part on the
economic theories of Coase, North, and De Soto. 67 This new NEI
consensus held that rational, efficient institutions-especially
governmental institutions-were in fact vital for maintaining a healthy

61.
62.

See id. at 32.
See id. at 52-54, 56.

63. See id at 56; see also THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING
OBSTACLES To GROWTH 3 (2005), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/fpdkm/

doing%20business/documents/annual-reports/english/dbO5-fullreport.pdf.
64. See Edmund Amann, Introduction, in REGULATING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 12 (describing 1990s development policy as focusing on privatization and market deregulation).
65. See generally Thomas Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World: The
Troubling Case ofNiger, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 321, 327-33 (2007).

66. Id. See Jalilian et al., supra note 16, at 12 (referring to arguments that privatization
failed due to political mismanagement and corruption); see also Kelley, supra note 15, at 1002
(summarizing various explanations of why the Washington Consensus failed).
67. See supra Part II.A.
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economy and long term political and social stability. 68 Thus, the task of
guiding poor countries toward more prosperous futures shifted from
disassembling their regulatory institutions to improving the quality of
those systems. 69
Translating NIE scholars' writings into concrete policy initiatives
fell in part to another American economist, Jeffrey Sachs, who
spearheaded an effort to bring the insights of NIE, along with the
general empirical rigor of economics,7 o to international development
work." Sachs took a leading role in orienting both the U.S. government
and the United Nations toward what became known as the Millennium
Development Goals, specific poverty reduction and development targets
that donor countries, and their partners in the developing world, would
commit to achieving.7 2 In 2004, the United States created a new agency,
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), to tackle its Millennium
Development commitments.73
The MCC delivers U.S. development assistance to countries that
demonstrate that they have good institutions, or are at least on the path
toward developing them.7 4 In an attempt to avoid past instances where
poor countries promised to undertake reforms but then failed to follow
through, the MCC adopted an ex ante development strategy, meaning
the MCC will not turn over the aid money until the developing countries
have already demonstrated progress in institution-building, and will not
continue to invest in countries unless they show ongoing progress. In
68. See Jalilian et al., supra note 16, at 12-13, 15 (describing the development consensus
that institutions matter).
69. Id.
70. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 9, at 1097 (referring to the "empirical and quantitative
flavor" of the latest wave of law and development schemes).
71.

See generally JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR

OUR TIME 122 (2005). Sachs advocated "shock therapy," also referred to as "big bang" reform,
for developing countries.
72. See id. at 210-13.
73. See Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 1 (referring to the 2004 founding of the MCC
as perhaps the most significant shift in U.S. foreign aid policy since President Kennedy created
USAID in 1961).
74. See id. at 4 (employing the terminology "sound policy environments").
75. Id. at 5. The MCC's incentive system is based upon a two-tier program of
engagement. Id. Poor countries that are heading in the right direction on institutional reform but
that have not yet achieved sufficient scores on the MCC's quantitative indicators may be offered
comparatively modest, short-term assistance in the form of a so-called Threshold Program. Id. at
6. The Threshold countries receive cash infusions and a period of time to improve their scores
and earn fill engagement by the MCC. Id. Full engagement comes in the form of an MCC
Compact, a written agreement in which a package of institutional and policy reforms are
proposed, at least in theory, by the recipient nation. Id at 5. Once crafted and adopted, the
Compact can provide tens of millions of dollars in development support over a period of several
years. See id. at 6 (noting the first two MCC Compacts included a combined $34 million in
development assistance).
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keeping with the quantitative nature of the economic philosophy to
which the MCC is committed, progress on institution building is
measured empirically rather than by the mere qualitative intuition of
policymakers and aid experts.76 In the confident words of a recent
World Bank report, "what gets measured gets done."77
The MCC has addressed the challenge of finding meaningful
quantitative measurements of institutional progress in poor countries by
developing sixteen so-called "MCC indicators" that rely on empirical
data collected from various existing sources to measure, among other
things, institutional soundness.7 8 The indicators are divided into three
distinct themes or categories: Encouraging Economic Freedom, Ruling
Justly, and Investing in People. 79 The MCC gathers the data, plugs them
into a formula, and summarizes them in easy to read charts. Active
and aspiring participants in MCC programs are supposed to vie with one
another in what is essentially a horserace to determine who has made
the most progress on the various indicators.81 Only the best performers
are graced with continuing financial support. 82
Niger entered into an agreement with the MCC and in doing so
committed to creating more efficient institutions to guide and regulate
its business sector. 83 Its hopes for winning larger sums of money from
76.

Id. at 5.

77. DOING BUSINESS REPORT 2007, supra note 17, at 3.
78. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS AND THE SELECTION
PROCESS: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 3-4 (2011) [hereinafter MCC GUIDE TO INDICATORS],
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/reports/reference-2010001040503-_fyl 1guidetotheindicators.

pdf. See also Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 6 (listing sixteen indicators).
79.

MCC GUIDE TO INDICATORS, supra note 78, at 3-4.

80. See generally id.
81. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 9, at 1096 (referring to the "trend toward legal
benchmarking and competition"). The indicators most relevant to "business formalization"
programs fall under the categories "Encouraging Economic Freedom" and "Ruling Justly." See
MCC GUIDE TO INDICATORS, supra note 78, at 3-4. Specifically, the category "Encouraging
Economic Freedom" includes the use of a "business start-up indicator," which measures the

number of bureaucratic steps and the amount of time it takes a typical businessman to establish a
small business in the subject country's capital city. See id. at 3. This indicator borrows directly
from the International Finance Corporation's (IFC's) annual "Doing Business" survey in which
it ranks countries around the world on how easy or difficult it is to do business within their
borders. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 9, at 1097-98. The IFC is an arm of the World Bank.
The Ruling Justly category includes a separate indicator, purporting to measure "control of
corruption," that ranks countries based on an amalgamation of several surveys that purport to
measure citizens' perceptions of corruption in their countries. See MCC GUIDE TO INDICATORS,

supra note 78, at 3, 11-13.
82.

See generallyMCC GUIDE TO INDICATORS, supra note 78.

83.

See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv., AGREEMENT No. 624-AA-A3-08-01,

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT THRESHOLD PROGRAM ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER TO SUPPORT PRIMARY SCHOOL EDUCATION FOR GIRLS,
IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF CORRUPTION AND STREAMLINE BUSINESS CREATION, LAND ACCESS
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the MCC in the future will depend on its ability to empirically
demonstrate progress on the MCC indicators.84
Before turning to a discussion of Niger's business sector and how it
is grappling with the new NIE reality, it should be noted that not
everyone is enamored of the new institutional approach to international
development. Some critique it on empirical grounds, arguing that there
is little evidence that the institutional package promoted by the United
States actually leads to economic growth, prosperity and stability.85
Others critique it on more normative grounds, arguing that it tends to
treat law as a politically neutral technology that can be transplanted and
left behind in a developing country like a road or a hydroelectric dam, 86
ignoring the fact that law is inextricably intertwined with a society's
particular notions of justice. 87 Legal and regulatory institutions
introduced as mere technology from the outside ignore the existing
political economy of the subject country and often are used by elites to
solidify their positions in ways that are manifestly unjust.
AND TITLING PROCEDURES (2008), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/agreements/
soag-niger.pdf [hereinafter MCC NIGER THRESHOLD AGREEMENT].

84. Niger's progress down the MCC pathway was interrupted in late 2009 by domestic
political instability. See Adam Nossiter, President Claims More Power in Niger's Disputed
Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/
world/africa/08niger.html (quoting political opponents describing the president's actions as "a
coup d'6tat in all but name"); MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION

TRANSMITTAL SHEET (2009), http://www.mcc.gov/documents/cn/cn-121709-niger-suspension.

pdf (informing Congress of the suspension of assistance to Niger as a result of "several
undemocratic actions to extend the Presidential term beyond the limits imposed by the
constitution of Niger and to consolidate power"). Threshold program assistance was reinstated
in mid-2011 under a new Nigerien president. Press Release, Millenium Challenge Corp., MCC
CEO Informs Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou of Reinstatement of Threshold Program
Assistance (2011), http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/mcc-ceo-informs-niger-presidentmahamadou-issoufou-of-reinstatement-of-thre.
85.

See Johnson & Zajonc, supra note 7, at 4, 19; see also BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at

119-27 (summarizing results of multiple empirical studies, some concluding that improved
institutions lead to economic growth, others concluding they do not); Michael A. McPherson &
Carl Liedholm, Determinants of Small Micro EnterpriseRegistration: Results from Surveys in
Niger and Swaziland, 24 WORLD DEV. 481, 485-86 (1996) (concluding that heavy bureaucratic
requirements do not have a significant effect on entrepreneurs' decisions whether or not to
register their businesses).
86. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE
CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 20

(2008).
87. See generally Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing that the law-astechnology approach strips law from all political considerations and ignores the specific
conditions of the subject country).
88. See MATTEI & NADER, supra note 23, at 3, 7 (arguing that current aid policy too often
focuses on efficiency and competition to the exclusion of social justice, which tends to favor
local elites over the poor). As to why law and development experts have put forward this
sterilized, essentially technological view of law and law reform, there are two predominant
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My hope is that this Article will be included among the dissenting
voices, but my grounds for dissent are pragmatic and experience-based
rather than quantitatively empirical or normative. As this Article will
illustrate in the following parts, institutional reform will not work in
Niger, at least not in the short term, because it fails to account for the
fact that an engrained institution-corruption-already exists.

III. INSTITUTIONALISM

AND BUSINESS FORMALIZATION IN NIGER'S
BUSINESS SECTOR

Conceptually, it would make sense to describe Niger's business
sector in its current form before delving in to a discussion about how the
institutions that govern it might be reformed. This is not, however, how
most law and development experts approach the task. They tend to dive
directly into business formalization programs without pausing to
understand the extant institutions in the subject country. This part will
follow the conceptual path of those law and development expertsdiscussing plans for formalization before understanding what already
exists-and by doing so will help illustrate what they are missing.
A. PolicyPrescriptionsand Legal Reform
In Niger, business formalization efforts have closely followed the
NIE/MCC script.8 9 In March 2008, Niger signed a $23 million90
Threshold Agreement91 that includes, among other goals, "streamlining
theories. One is that if you are an economist, as it seems most development experts these days
are, notions like justice and the distribution of political power are hard to measure, squeeze into
regression analyses, and plot on charts. Therefore, you ignore, or at least marginalize, such
considerations. See id at 49, 94 (arguing that economists find ideology intellectually
uninteresting and that they consider obsolete any argument that cannot be understood and
described in graphs and numbers). See generally NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF,
THE WORLD BANK AND THEIR BORROWERS (2006) (examining the role of the IMF and the World

Bank in international relations). A slightly more cynical version of this explanation points out
that the international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF that have
taken the lead in implementing the law-as-technology approach are forbidden by their charters
from straying into the realm of politics, whereas nothing prevents them from being involved in
technology transfer. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 86, at 20-21. They therefore adopt,
consciously or unconsciously, strained definitions of law that permit them to take what they
view as appropriate action. See id.
89. See supra Part II.
90.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., NIGER THRESHOLD QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT

(2009) [hereinafter MCC NIGER STATUS REPORT], http://www.mcc.gov/documents/reports/qsrniger.pdf.
91. See id. (reporting Mar. 17, 2008 as the signing date of the Threshold Agreement). See
generally MCC NIGER THRESHOLD AGREEMENT, supra note 83.
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the process of starting a business by establishing the administrative,
legal and regulatory structures required to implement business
facilitation reforms . . . ."92 Through these legal and regulatory reforms
the government aims to "reduce the cost for starting a business by 84
percent," and "reduce the number of days to start a business from 24 to
14 and the number of procedures required from 11 to 7." The
Threshold Program also aims to attack corruption, particularly within
Niger's health and education sectors 94 where corrupt practices are
thought to be most rampant. 95 A year after the Threshold Program
agreement was signed, the MCC was still fitting out office space in
Niger's capital, Niamey, and hiring host country and expatriate staff,96
but that has not stopped the government from moving forward with its
legal and administrative reforms.
Niger's business-facilitation legal reforms have been numerous and
rapid. Although this purports to be an Article that is at least partly about
law reform, it will not dwell on the details of the various reformed
codes and legal decrees because it suffices to say that they all aim to
usher Niger toward the business-facilitative legal environment desired
by NIE and MCC reformers. 9 7 They streamline and rationalize
government regulation; they liberalize economic oversight; they protect
investors' contracts and property and permit them to move their
investment capital and profits freely in and out of the country.9 Such
features are included in Niger's new Investment Code, which is
designed to attract foreign direct investment by enhancing investors'

92. MCC NIGER STATUS REPORT, supra note 90.
93. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., Working with Niger to Promote Education, Combat
Corruption 3-4 (2008) [hereinafter MCC NIGER FACT SHEET], http://www.mcc.gov/documents/

press/factsheet-0 I 3008-niger.pdf.
94. Id. at 1.
95. See Interview with Seller of Home and Office Furnishings, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 5,
2009) [hereinafter Interview with Seller] (on file with author) (indicating that health and
education are particularly valued as opportunities for corruption because, compared to other
ministries, they purchase large quantities of materials; specifically, while casually talking about
which ministries are open for corruption, he pulled an exemplar out of his briefcase and showed
it to me, indicating that corruption is commonplace if not rampant).
96.

See MCC NIGER STATUS REPORT, supra note 90 (indicating that evaluation

consultants had been hired in December 2008 and that the program anticipated a launch in
Niamey in February 2009). 1 visited the MCC offices in Niamey in late February 2009 and
observed that it was just beginning to function.
97. See supra Part II.
98.

See generally REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER, MINISTERE DU COMMERCE, DE L'INDUSTRIE ET

DE LA NORMALISATION, POUR UNE AMELIORATION DU CLIMAT DES AFFAIRS [REPUBLIC OF NIGER,
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND NORMALIZATION, FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE
BUSINESS CLIMATE] (n.d.) [hereinafter PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS

CLIMATE] (copy on file with author).
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property rights. 9 9 Likewise, Niger's recent adoption of a Mining Code
and a Petroleum Code are intended to attract foreign direct investment
and intensification of business activity in Niger by allowing market
competition between private actors and by liberalizing strictures on the
removal of business profits. 00 Finally, in addition to adopting a surfeit
of new laws aimed at opening and rationalizing its domestic business
environment, Niger has also fully adopted the regional OHADA
Business Code-the equivalent of a West African Uniform Commercial
Code-in an effort to harmonize its laws with those of other countries
in the region and thereby stimulate regional trade.' 0
In addition to these major legislative projects, the Government of
Niger has created by decree several new business-enhancing
institutions. For example, it recently formed a National Council of
Private Investors, under the direction of the Prime Minister's office, to
address at the highest levels the needs and concerns of private
investors.10 Linked to this Council of Investors and also under the
direction of the Prime Minister, the government formed a refinancing
fund that will in theory provide investment capital to small and
medium-sized enterprises.' 0 Many other legal reforms have been put in
place, all intended to improve the economic climate and the institutional
and regulatory structure for doing business in Niger.104
99. See id. at 5. See generally Ordinance No. 89-19 of Dec. 8, 1989 on the Investment
Code in the Republic of Niger, as amended by Ordinance No. 97-09 of Feb. 27, 1997,
Ordinance No. 99-69 of Dec. 20, 1999 and Law No. 2001-20 of July 12, 2001, available at
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.ccaian.org/codeinvestissement
.html&ei=XqEuT807MIu5tweN4PzRDw&sa=X&oi-translate&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=OC
FUQ7gEwBQ&prev=/search%3Fq%3DCode%2Bdes%2Binvestissements%2BNiger%26hl%3
Den%26biw/o3DI 680%26bih%3D925%26prmd%3Dimvns.
100.

PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98, at

5. See generally Niger Petroleum Code, Law Number 2007-01 of Jan. 31, 2007, available at
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/tex
tes/Niger/Niger/o2520-%2520Code%2520petrolier/o25202007.pdf&ei=faMuT5zrE8iltweGn4
3sDw&sa=X&oi-translate&ct-result&resnum= 1&sqi=2&ved=OCDAQ7gEwAA&prev=/search
%3Fq%3DLoi%2Bno%2B2007-01%2Bdu%2B31%2Bjanvier/o2B2007%2Bportant%2BCod
e%2Bpetrolier %26hl%3Den%26biw%3D1680%26bih%3D925%26prmd%3Dimvns.
101.

PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98,

at 2. See generally Claire Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the
Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17 (2005) (furnishing a general description of OHADA).
102.

PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98,

at 2.
103. Id. But see Interview with Former Director General of a Private Radio Station, supra
note 27 (expressing dismay that small loan funds in Niger are ineffectual and never seem to
actually loan money to anyone who needs it); Interview with Young Man Who Services
Computers and Sells Computer Peripherals, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Feb.
23, 2009 Interview with Young Man] (on file with author) (stating that government programs
never help small businessmen, even when that is what they are designed to do).
104.

PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98,
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The Government of Niger has also committed to enhancing the
business environment by undertaking certain administrative reforms.
For example, it has pledged to further ease the burden of starting a new
business by forming "one-stop centers" (guichet unique) for new
enterprises where they can, at least in theo 7 , take care of all necessary
The government further
formalities for forming a business entity.
pledges to reduce the number of bureaucratic steps necessary to
complete the business registration process, to computerize that multistep process, and to develop and distribute "how to" guides on new
business creation geared toward citizen entrepreneurs.1 06
In addition to these measures, the government has, at least in form,
undertaken legal and administrative reform aimed at combating
corruption. The anti-corruption steps, which have been pledged but not
yet fully implemented, include enhancing the government's ability to
conduct audits, providing anti-corruption training for officials who are
in charge of public procurement for government agencies, publishing
information in the media and on websites about government purchasing
and opportunities for businessmen to bid on government contracts, and
teaching media organizations and civil society groups how to scrutinize
For purposes of this
government actors and root out corruption.
treats business
MCC
the
that
note
to
Article, it is significant
formalization as an entirely separate program component from "control
of corruption," and focuses its anti-corruption interventions not on
interactions between the business and public sectors, but on government
activity in the Health and Education ministries.los
at 5.
105. See Interview with a Top Official in Niger's Ministry of Commerce, in Niamey,
Niger (Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Top Official] (on file with author) (describing
the benefits of the guichet unique); see also Interview with a Top Official of Niger's Chamber
of Commerce, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with author) (mentioning the guichet
unique but saying many officials in various government ministries were determined to make the
"one-stop centers" fail because they cut into their opportunities for corruption); PUBLICATION ON
THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98, at 2 (mentioning the guichet
unique as an important improvement in Niger's business climate).
106. MCC NIGER FACT SHEET, supranote 93, at 2-3.
107. Id. at 1-2.
108. See generally PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE,
supra note 98 (describing Niger's improved business climate, noting that Niger in 2006-07
overtook fifteen countries in the World Bank's "Doing Business" rankings, and declaring
Niger's specific commitment to improving its "private and public institutions"). In addition to
these legal and regulatory steps, Niger has unleashed what might be described as a charm
offensive to promote the efficiency of its improved business climate. With the Ministry of
Commerce in the forefront, the government has produced glossy, sometimes bilingual
(French/English) publications that proclaim its commitment to business-facilitative institutional
reform. They employ language that is strikingly similar to that of the MCC and other Western
aid organizations, unabashedly trumpeting the government's embrace of business enhancement,
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B. Business in Niger as It Is Actually Practiced
1. Quantitative Description
Niger is an extremely poor country, perpetually ranking at or near
the bottom of the U.N. Human Development Index.109 According to the
World Bank, 61% of its population lives in extreme poverty on less than
one dollar per day and average per capita income in 2008 was $330.110
It is vast and landlocked and most of its terrain is in the Sahara Desert,
which means it has limited arable land,"' a critical problem in a country
where most people survive as subsistence farmers.112 Its population is
estimated at almost 15 million" 3 with an approximately 30% rate of
literacy.11 4 At 3.3%, its population growth rate is among the fastest in
the world." 5
Officially, Niger's private sector economy is miniscule, with fewer
than 1000 formal enterprises."6 It suffers from an underdeveloped
improvement of the investment climate, open trade, regional economic integration, free
competition, commitment to the rule of law, good governance, and democracy. See, e.g., THE
INVESTMENT CODE OF NIGER, June-July,

2008 (bilingual magazine

promoting Niger's

investment opportunities and stable business environment); PUBLICATION ON THE IMPROVEMENT
OF NIGER'S BUSINESS CLIMATE, supra note 98; MINISTERE DU COMMERCE, DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE
LA NORMALISATION, NOTE SUR LE CLIMAT DES AFFAIRES [MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY
AND STANDARDS, A NOTE ON THE BUSINESS CLIMATE] (2009) (copy on file with author) (a twopage summary, authored by the minister's office, of Niger's recent business enhancement
measures).
109. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009), available at

http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009 [hereinafter 2009 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT]
(ranking Niger as the least developed country in the world). The U.N. Development Index
measures countries' achievements in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment, and
adjusted real income. See id. at 49-60. It is compiled annually as part of the U.N. Development
Program's annual Human Development Report. Id.
110. See THE WORLD BANK, NIGER: COUNTRY BRIEF [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK,
NIGER], available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICA
EXT/NIGEREXTN/0,,menuPK:382460-pagePK: 141132-piPK: 141107theSitePK:382450,00.
html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
111. See WORLD BANK NIGER GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT, supra note 19,
at 2 (stating 12% of Niger's land is arable); see also THE WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 29752-NE,
REPUBLIC OF NIGER PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

REVIEw I (2005), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
(noting 13% of
IB/2005/03/25/000012009_20050325091610/Rendered/PDF/297520NE.pdf

Niger's land is "cropped" and 1.5% is irrigated).
112. See THE WORLD BANK, NIGER, supra note 110 (noting that Niger's economy is
dominated by rain-fed agriculture).
113. Id.

114. Id.
115.

at 2.
116.

WORLD BANK NIGER GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT, supra note 19,

Id.
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financial sector.1 17 The country's economy has grown strongly in recent
years, but that growth is due largely to better than average rains, which
bolstered Niger's predominantly rain fed agricultural sector,h8 and
increased commodity prices associated with Niger's uranium mining
and nascent oil extraction industry. 119 Unless Niger's economy
diversifies beyond agriculture and natural resource extraction, it will
remain subject to factors that it has no control over: seasonal rainfall
and international commodity prices.120
Given Niger's diminutive formal private sector, it should not be
surprising that the government is a major force in its economy in spite
of IMF and World Bank-inspired retrenchment in recent years.121
According to the World Bank, government expenditures account for
approximately one third of the country's gross domestic product.122 This
too will become an important statistic when we arrive later at the
discussion of corruption.
2. Qualitative Description
Three themes emerge from a close study' 23 of small businesses in
Niger.124 First, and perhaps most obvious given the topic of this Article,
the proprietors of small businesses in Niger tend to undertake their
activities in the informal sector outside of direct government oversight
and regulation. 125 Second, small Nigerien businesses, whether formal or
informal, constantly struggle to obtain start-up and expansion capital.126
Third, ambitious Nigerien businessmen, particularly merchants who buy
117. Id. at 2-3, 12-13. See WORLD BANK GROUP, SUMMARY OF NIGER: INVESTMENT
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 2-3 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFR

SUMAFTPS/Resources/aftpsnote30FO610-17.pdf (arguing lack of access and high cost of
financing impede Niger's economic growth).
118. THE WORLD BANK, NIGER, supra note 110. See WORLD BANK NIGER GROWTH POLICY
REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT, supra note 19, at 4 (noting "Niger's economy has been growing

strongly in the past four years . . . mainly due to a rebound from the 2004 drought").
119.

WORLD BANK NIGER GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT, supra note 19, at

4. See generally Adam Nossiter, After a Coup, Niger Resumes Business as Usual with China,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/world/africa/25
niger.html (mentioning Niger's growing oil industry).
120.

at 4.
121.

See WORLD BANK NIGER GROWTH POLICY REFORM GRANT DOCUMENT, supra note 19,

Id. at 5.

122. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, COUNTRY REPORT No. 09/70, NIGER:
SELECTED ISSUES AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX 85 (2009) (indicating that government

expenditures account for approximately one third of the country's "modem sector"), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0970.pdf.
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See discussion infra Part Ill.B.
125. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a.
126. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
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and sell goods, aspire to move up the commercial chain from retail to
wholesale, and, to accomplish that hoped-for evolution, must travel to
distant lands to purchase their goods at lower prices.127
a. Informality as the Norm
There are no reliable statistics regarding the prevalence of informal
businesses in Niger so one must rely on inference, anecdote, and
observation. This is understandable, because it is a defining feature of
informal businesses that they prefer not to be counted or otherwise
recognized. 128 Recent studies of the informal business sector across
Africa find that a significant percentage of all businesses operate
informally.' 2 9 An official of Niger's tax service told me that the service
had recently undertaken an in-house study and concluded that
merchants in Niamey's Grand Marchi paid business taxes on
approximately 5% of their profits while the rest of the economic activity
took place in the informal sector. 130 The best that can be said is that
many businesses in Africa and certainly most small businesses in Niger
operate informally.'31
Niamey's central business district has a handful of large, well
established retail businesses, many of which are owned by Lebanese
entrepreneurs. Those stores are patronized mostly by expatriates and
wealthy Nigeriens, and, not surprisingly, their prices tend to be high.
Bargain hunters-a class that includes the overwhelming majority of
Niger's population and American Peace Corps volunteers-patronize
instead the GrandMarchi,Niamey's bustling, centrally located open air
market. Most any shopping expedition in the Grand Marchi, or any of
Niamey's other open air markets, provides an object lesson in the ways
and means of the informal sector.
In the Grand Marchi, thousands of businessmen 3 2 sell all
127. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.c.
128. Alex Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An
EmpiricalAnalysis 2 (Ctr. for Research in Econ., Mgmt. & the Arts, Working Paper No. 200601, 2006) (noting the "shadow economy" does not lend itself to easy measurement). See BRUCE
ET AL., supra note 6, at 10-13 (discussing the difficulty of measuring informality).
129. See, e.g., Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, Shadow Economies: Size, Causes,
and Consequences, 38 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 77, 81 (2000) (remarking that some countries,
including Nigeria, show an underground sector nearly three-quarters the size of officially
recorded GDP); BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 124 (estimating the overall informal economy in
Africa accounts for 42% of GDP).
130. Interview with an Employee of Niger's Tax Service, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 6, 2009)
(on file with author).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
132. Interview with an Employee of Niger's Tax Service, supra note 130 (indicating that
approximately three thousand enterprises are officially registered to do business in the Grand
Marche).
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description of wares. They are crammed together in small stalls amidst a
profusion of sounds and brilliant colors. Most of the market is open to
the weather, but the businessmen string colorful cloths overhead to
provide shade, enhancing the sense that the market is a multi-colored
maze.
The market does not have the outwardly orderly appearance and
structure that most Western observers are accustomed to. There is
virtually no signage and no advertising. Merchants who sell similar
wares tend to cluster together, so in the vast market there is a consumer
electronics section, a hardware section, a food section, and a women's
footwear section.
A shopper strolling through the market might notice that certain
merchants appear quite prosperous: their shops are somewhat larger and
their customers address them with the honorific title El Hadgi, which
means that they have been able to afford to make the pilgrimage to
Mecca.1 3 3 This may seem incongruous given that there appears to be
little retail traffic into their shops, but the explanation is linked to their
businesses' informality.
A shopper searching for women's shoes who has arrived at the
proper corner of the market will discover that none of the merchants'
wares are tagged, and that sale prices must be determined through
haggling.134 Eventually, when the terms of the transaction are settled,
the buyer must hand over cash. No businesses in the market or
anywhere else in the country, save for a few high-end hotels and
boutiques, accept personal checks or credit cards. When the transaction
is complete, the merchant will offer no bill of sale. In the rare case
133. Through my experience in the field, I have discovered that "El Hadgi" refers in its
strictest sense to a man who has made the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca; the pilgrimage is one of
the five pillars of Islam and most Nigeriens aspire to it, though only the wealthiest few can
afford it. Further field work has uncovered that when young businessmen achieve their first
significant economic success, their first major expense, after marrying and setting up a
household, is making the pilgrimage and, if funds allow, sponsoring pilgrimages for elderly
family members. In common usage, the term "El Hadgi businessman" or "El Hadgi merchant"
refers to the rich and powerful merchants who dominate Niger's economic and political realms.
See generally GREGOIRE, supra note 24 (describing the "Alhazai" businessmen who populate the
markets in Maradi, a market city in south-central Niger).
134. Based upon my field work, the final price will depend on a multiplicity of factors:
what the merchant paid for the goods, the time of day and the time of the month, whether he has
made recent sales, whether he has bills due, his estimation of the customer's willingness to pay,
and whether in fact it is his boutique. Similarly, my field work has demonstrated that many who
run retail operations are younger relatives of the true owners or are friends or fellow merchants
covering for the owner while he attends Muslim prayers or to personal business. Someone
covering for the owner is less likely to sell the goods at a low price. See generally Thomas
Kelley, Law School Admissions Essay, in ESSAYS THAT WORKED FOR LAW SCHOOLS 22-23

(Boykin Curry ed., 1988) (describing strategies for bargaining for meat in West African
markets).
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where a customer asks for written record, the merchant will say he has
no paper. If the customer insists, the merchant may write a receipt with
someone else's name on it or he may simply refuse to complete the sale.
Each of these observations about the market can be explained by the
businessmen's desire to operate informally. There are two reasons for
the lack of signage and advertising. The first is that there is a specific
governmental tax on business signs,1 35 which small merchants typically
do not wish to pay. More important, most of the merchants run their
small businesses informally, and they prefer not to draw the attention of
government tax assessors or other agents. This reluctance to advertise
explains, at least in part, why similar businesses cluster together in vast
market. If all of the women's shoe stalls are in the same section of the
market, customers in search of shoes learn quickly where to begin
browsing in spite of the absence of signs.
The explanation for the lack of written records is obvious. In the
unlikely event that government investigators appear, there will be no
written records to audit, indeed, no written record to indicate that any
business transaction has taken place.1 36
The fact that some merchants appear prosperous in spite of an
apparent lack of retail traffic is not directly related to business
informality but is worth noting because it bolsters another observation
regarding Nigerien business, explored in Part III.B.3. Those apparently
prosperous El Hadgis have very likely succeeded in moving up the
chain from retail to a mix of wholesale and retail, and much of their
wealth comes from the selling goods to other merchants.
A final important observation regarding the informality of Niger's
businesses is that the descriptors "informal" and "formal" are points on
a continuum rather than binary categories. Many businesses choose to
have no formal existence but they do sometimes pay taxes and other
fees when the are pinned down by government tax collectors and
investigators. 13 Some businesses, for strategic reasons take limited
steps toward formalizing, for example by requesting a "NIF" (roughly
135.

THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012: NIGER 72, http://www.doing business.org/

-/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/NER.pdf (listing taxes businesses in Niger must pay, including an "advertising tax").
136. See Nassirou Bako Arifari, We Don't Eat the Papers: Corruption in Transport,
Customs, and Civil Forces, in EVERYDAY CORRUPTION, supra note 26, at 213 (referring to the
general preference for oral dealings when negotiating corrupt customs transactions).
137. See Interview with Owner of Several Small Businesses, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 20,
2009) (second interview) [hereinafter Second Interview with Owner] (on file with author)
(revealing that he runs some of his ventures through a formally established business and others
informally); see also Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes in the Grand March, in
Niamey, Niger (Feb. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's
Shoes] (on file with author) (saying he prefers to operate informally but had to obtain a
government tax identification number for doing business directly with government agencies).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
26

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

the equivalent of an Employer Identification Number in the United
States) from the Nigerien government but will undertake none of the
remaining steps.13 8 Also, certain entrepreneurs strategically move in and
out of the formal sector. They may have no ongoing relationship with a
formal business, but seek one out for purposes of a single business
transaction in which official status is required. Afterwards, they migrate
back to the informal sector. This Article will continue to refer to
informal and formal as if they were starkly separate categories, trusting
the reader to remember the gray areas in between.
b. Constant Struggle for Capital
When Nigerien businessmen recount the histories of their
enterprises, their stories often revolve around the quest for start-up or
expansion capital. 139 Financial institutions such as banks are rarely on
their list of possible sources.140
Most entrepreneurs fund their start-ups with a loan of cash and
saleable goods from family members or from personal savings. A
typical small business owner's story centers on an older male relative
such as a father, uncle, or brother who helps establish the younger man
in business.141 The youngster spends several years working as an
apprentice in his relative's business, receiving basic maintenance but no
fixed salary in exchange for his work.142 Eventually, when the younger
male is ready, the elder male gives him or loans him sufficient capitalin most cases the equivalent of a few thousand dollars-to launch his
own retail venture.'43
The other common route to accumulating start-up capital is through
the sweat of the aspiring entrepreneur's brow. Here, the young man
spends his evenings and school vacations peddling goods on the
street.144 After years of such labor and a strong determination to save
138. See Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 137.
139. See, e.g., Interview with Three Members of the Young Chamber, in Niamey, Niger
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with author) (identifying start-up capital as young entrepreneurs'
primary problem); Interview with Young Man Who Services Computers and Sells Computer
Peripherals, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young
Man] (on file with author) (describing his desperate need for expansion capital).
140. See Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (explaining that banks
rarely lend to small businesses and, when they do, only on outrageous terms); see also Second
Interview with Owner, supra note 137 (expressing suspicion and distrust of banks in Niger).
141. See, e.g., Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 137
(recounting that he got his start in business working for his older brother); Interview with the
Manager of a Rental Car Business, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 23, 2009) (on file with author) (also
recounting that he got his start in business working for his older brother).
142. See Interview with the Manager of a Rental Car Business, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Interview with Young Electronics Merchant in the Grand Marchi, in
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the profits, the young man moves from ambulatory selling to purchasing
higher-end A oods and renting a retail space in the Grand Marche or
elsewhere.' One young merchant got his start selling cell phones to his
school companions and to pedestrians near his school. 146 When he had
accumulated sufficient capital, he opened a consumer electronics
boutique in the Grand Marchi.147 Another spent his summers cutting
grass for animal fodder in the countryside outside of Niamey,
transporting it to the city by donkey cart, and selling it to urban
dwellers. 14a He used his accumulated profits from that and other petty
labor to buy a bar in Niamey and he eventually became a wealthy and
powerful merchant. 149 Of the many proprietors of small businesses that I
interviewed in Niger, not one had started his business by borrowing
from any financial institution. 1o
Businessmen in Niger are almost as reluctant to approach banks for
expansion capital as they are for start-up capital. * Most of the
entrepreneurs I interviewed in Niamey had expanded their businesses or
had ambitions to do so and all but one considered it either unlikely or
impossible that they would ever borrow from a financial institution.1 52
For most small businessmen, a bank loan would be out of the question
because the business does not officially exist and the bank would not
loan to a shadow enterprise.1 53 However, even for fully formalized
Niamey, Niger (Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Young Electronics Merchant] (on file
with author) (recounting his accumulation of start-up capital through petty commerce and wage
labor). The streets of Niamey are full of young men carrying stacks of portable goods on their
heads: pirated music cassettes or films on CD, cheap sunglasses, medicines and sundries,
articles of used clothing, and so on.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Interview with the Owner of Numerous Small, Medium, and Large Business
Enterprises, in Niamey, Niger (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., First Interview with Owner, supra note 26; see also Interview with Seller,
supra note 95; Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103.
151. See Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes in the Grand Marchi, in Niamey,
Niger (Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with Seller of Woman's Shoes] (on
file with author) (describing Nigerien banks as expensive, slow and unreliable); see also Mar. 2,
2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (discussing how it is very difficult to receive
reasonable financing from a bank); Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144
(mentioning avoiding banks).
152. See Interview with Owner of Numerous Small, Medium, and Large Business
Enterprises, supra note 148 (saying with his many enterprises he occasionally takes business
loans from banks but only if absolutely necessary).
153. See generally DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 11 (informal
businesses cannot get access to capital because they have nothing concrete to offer as collateral);
see generally DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 11 (informal businesses cannot get access
to capital because they have nothing concrete to offer as collateral).
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businesses, banks are often not an option because they are too expensive

and too risky.' 54
For example, a scrappy young owner of a small boutique that
services computers and sells computer peripherals expressed an intense
desire to expand his fully formalized business, but said he would not
approach a bank because typical loan terms include ruinously high
interest rates and the necessity of rapid repayment.' 5 5 His boutique was
located in a shack by the side of a dirt road in Niamey, but through the
sweat of his brow he had done extremely well, employing seven
fulltime workers, paying good salaries with benefits to everyone
including himself, and accumulating enough money personally to
purchase several residential properties in Niamey.' 56 According to him,
if he could borrow the equivalent of $50,000 to $60,000 on reasonable
terms, he could expand his business rapidly and, due to his high level of
training and expertise, compete with the larger, typically foreign-owned
computer companies in Niamey.'5 7 But his plans were stymied because
of the unavailability of expansion capital at reasonable rates.15 8 Even
though his business was fully formalized under Niger's laws, and even
though he was willing to pledge his personal real estate as collateral,
Nigerien banks would charge high interest on a business expansion
loanl 59 and would demand that the principal and interest be returned in
three years or less.160 On those terms, there would be too much risk of
losing the enterprise and the investment properties that he would offer
154. See First Interview with Owner, supra note 26 (recounting an instance where a bank
employee embezzled money from his business account); see also Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with
Young Man, supra note 103 (complaining about the ruinous interest rates and difficult
repayment terms that banks require of small businesses and small businessmen's high risk of
losing their enterprises if they cannot meet the banks' terms); Interview with an Owner of
Numerous Small, Medium, and Large Business Enterprises, supra note 148 (decrying the unfair
terms of most bank loans); Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note
137 (saying he often accepts payment from other merchants in goods rather than cash to avoid
dealing with banks).
155. Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (stating banks would
charge at least 15% interest even if they accepted his homes as collateral, which they generally
do not); see also Interview with Owner of Numerous Small, Medium, and Large Business
Enterprises, supra note 148 (saying banks do not consider real estate safe collateral, not because
of lack of secure title, but because the overall economy is so weak that there are few bidders
when foreclosed real estate is sold at auction).
160. See Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (complaining about
"taking a three-year loan" and having to pay back double at the end of that time). Interview with
Owner of Numerous Small, Medium, and Large Business Enterprises, supra note 148
(complaining that "I cannot get a decent rate or even a term of more than about 30 months, even
for a significant real estate purchase . . .").
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as collateral.161 He and others complained bitterly that Nigerien banks
refuse to invest in small business enterprises with prospects for longterm growth but trip over one another to loan hundreds of thousands of
dollars each year to powerful business and political figures who use the
money to buy enormous quantities of sugar before Ramadan, the
Muslim month of fasting, when the faithful often break their fast by
munching on sugar cubes.' 6 2 Without viable banks or other financial
institutions, small businessmen in Niger are starved for capital,
particularly expansion capital.163
3. Moving Up the Commercial Chain from Retail to Wholesale and the
Importance of Cross-Border Purchasing Trips
It is common wisdom among the proprietors of small businesses in
Niger that one becomes prosperous by moving up the chain from retail
to wholesale.1 64 A small retail operation such as a stall or small boutique
in the Grand Marche; can produce enough income to cover household
expenses for the proprietor and his immediate family, but in most cases
not enough to contribute sigificantly to the welfare of the wider family
or to accumulate capital.' With wholesale operations-for example,
importing large quantities of electronic goods from distant countries and
selling them in lots to merchants in the Grand Marchi and other large
urban markets-the margins are narrower than retail, but the profits are
comparatively swift and certain. 166 For many businessmen, the long
term strategy, or at least the long term hope, is to cover household
expenses from the proceeds of retail operations, and to use the proceeds
from wholesale operations to move further up the wholesale chain,
161. Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103.
162. See id. See also Interview with Top Official, supra note 105.
163. Nigerien businessmen sometimes employ parallel, informal finance mechanismseven in international business transactions-that help them avoid dealing with banks and other
formal financial institutions. Some simply carry huge amounts of cash on their bodies. See
Interview with the Manager of a Rental Car Business, supra note 141 (recounting purchasing
trips to West African ports where he carried as much as $40,000 on his body). Others employ an
international network of wealthy El Hadgi traders who, much like merchant bankers in medieval
Europe, cooperate to provide credit and the transfer of capital across borders. See Interview with
Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144. A detailed discussion of this parallel finance
system is beyond the scope of this Article.
164. See Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151
(describing the benefits of moving from retail to wholesale); Interview with Young Electronics
Merchant, supra note 144 (same); Interview with a Seller of Fabric in the Grand Marche, in
Niamey, Niger (Mar. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Seller of Fabric] (on file with author)
(same); Interview with a Young Money Changer, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 11, 2009) (on file
with author) (ruing that he had not accumulated enough capital to move to wholesale).
165. See Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151.
166. See id.; see also Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144.
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purchasing ever larger quantities of goods from ever more distant
markets. This, small businessmen in Niger say, is the path to
prosperity. 167
Moving from retail to wholesale, however, is not an easy
progression.168 It generally requires the businessman to obtain goods in
quantity from a distant port. In most cases, he must travel to that port to
choose the goods and make payment in person.' 6 9 As a rule of thumb,
the farther he can travel from landlocked Niger to purchase the goods,
the lower the purchase price and the higher the profits.' 7 0 Nigerien
businessmen's most common destinations for these wholesalepurchasing trips are the West African port cities of Cotonou, Lome,
Abidjan, and Lagos.1 7 ' Prices are lower yet, and profits are
correspondingly larger, if the businessman can travel to more distant
lands such as Dubai, China, the United States, or Europe.172
But the challenge of purchasing wholesale goods in distant lands
links directly to Nigerien businessmen's challenge of accumulating
expansion capital, because buying goods in quantity in distant ports
requires a significant initial investment to cover the cost of bulk
purchasing as well as the high costs of travel, shipping purchased goods
To
back to Niger, clearing customs, and paying the requisite taxes.
167. Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with a Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151; Interview
with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144. This mix of retail and wholesale operations
helps explain the phenomenon, described in Part III.B.2.a, of the businessman who sells retail
goods out of a market stall or tin shack or crumbling store front, yet who appears prosperous by
Nigerien standards. Often, that businessman is comparatively prosperous because his retail
operation is only the tip of the iceberg: he or his underlings may be traveling to distant ports and
selling wholesale goods all over Niger.
168. Interview with Seller of Fabric, supra note 164 (complaining that it is very difficult to
move from retail to wholesale unless one has "connections"); see Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with
Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151 (explaining that he already engages in some
wholesaling but that he could really become prosperous if he could purchase wholesale goods
from beyond Africa).
169. Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151.
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with Seller of women's Shoes, supra note 137
(mentioning purchasing trips to Lome, Abidjan, and Lagos).
172. See Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144 (discussing the
advantages of Dubai and China as purchasing destinations); Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with
Young Man, supra note 103 (explaining that France is the best place to buy high quality
computer equipment for Niger); Interview with the Owner of an Auto Parts Shop Near the New
Market, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with author) (explaining that Dubai is the
best and cheapest place to buy most auto parts but Holland is the best place to purchase motor
oil). See also Feb. 22, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 137
(expressing frustration that he had not been able to finance purchasing trips beyond West
Africa).
173. See Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103 (saying he could not
launch a proper purchasing expedition because of lack of capital); see also Interview with
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return to the example of the ambitious young businessman who services
computers and sells peripherals from a shack by the side of a dirt road,
he claimed that he could become a significant commercial player in
Niger's computer industry if he could add the sale of computer
hardware-both wholesale and retail-to his business.' 74 France would
be the best place for him to purchase high quality, reliable computer
hardware, but for him to mount a meaningful purchasing trip to France,
he would need at least $50,000 in cash.1 75 No bank or other formal
financial institution will loan him such an amount on viable terms.' 7 6
For the young computer entrepreneur, and for most other Nigerien
businessmen, the only way to raise the necessary capital is to engage in
corruption, which is the topic of the following part.
IV. A PRIMER ON CORRUPTION
Proprietors of small businesses in Niger aspire to move up the
commercial chain from retail to wholesale. Doing so requires them to
travel to distant ports to purchase goods in quantity, but such trips are
difficult to accomplish because they are expensive and require
significant amounts of capital in an atmosphere where formal financial
institutions are unable or unwilling to provide the funds.177 Where do
businessmen obtain their capital? The surprising conclusion that arose
from my fieldwork in Niger is that corruption provides the primary
mechanism by which businessmen obtain capital to fund their
purchasing expeditions. Corruption also aids them to maximize their
profits by avoiding customs duties and taxes.
Because corruption is so central to the functioning of Niger's small
business sector, this part provides a primer: how and why corruption has
emerged in recent years as a global issue, how it manifests itself in
Africa, how it is defined, and why it is harmful. This Article will then
turn to a description of Niger's corruption and how it furnishes the rules
of the game for the small business sector.

Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144 (explaining how he avoids paying the heavy taxes
and customs duties on goods he imports from Dubai and China).
174. Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
177.

See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,

CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 110 (1999) [hereinafter

RoSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT]

(arguing that corrupt elites who control

credit and finance in developing countries may work to ensure that normal commercial banking
does not flourish in their societies).
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A. CorruptionEmerges as a GlobalIssue
Corruption in the developing world emerged as a hot global topic in
the 1990s.' 7 8 During the Cold War, the United States and other Western
powers were loath to focus on corruption for fear of driving developing
countries' corrupt leaders toward the Eastern bloc.179 This changed with
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Western donor nations felt empowered to
press the issue even if it caused the leaders of developing countries to
squirm. 1o At the same time, Western countries began to adopt the
rubric of "human security" as the basis of development policy: the view
that long-term peace in the developing world depended not only on
armies and weapons but on such matters as political stability, public
health, and economic prosperity. 8 Because corruption was thought to
retard these positive outcomes, anti-corruption programs migrated to the
Indeed, both the U.S.
center of international development policy.'
State Department and USAID proclaim the global battle against
corruption as among their highest priorities.18 3
The intense international focus on corruption has been accompanied
by a surfeit of new anti-corruption organizations, most prominently,
Transparency International (TI). TI took the lead in measuring
corruption by devising surveys that test citizens' perceptions of
corruption in their countries quantifying the results, and publishing
them in comparative reports.' In the latest TI survey, for example, one
178. Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 7.

179. See Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the Context of
U.S. Foreign Assistance with Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 Sw. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 1, 3 (2005) (noting that as late as the 1990s many governments and aid organizations
did not want to admit to or discuss corruption due partly to resistance from powerful vested
interests); Kimberly Ann Elliott, Corruption as an InternationalPolicy Problem: Overview and
Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 175-76.

180. Hendrix, supra note 179, at 9.
181. Glynn et al., supra note 178, at 9-10.
182. Id.; Hendrix, supra note 179, at 2 (noting that a powerful global consensus against
corruption has emerged and that nearly 100 nations had signed the 2003 U.N. Convention
Against Corruption and that the United States now views corruption as a threat to national
security).
183. Hendrix, supranote 179, at 2-3.
184. Although such surveys have become an important tool of anti-corruption policy, they
are subject to criticism because they are premised on the unproven assumption that there is a
strong correlation between perceived and actual corruption. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Causes
and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?
[hereinafter Lambsdorff], in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 3. It is beyond the

scope of this Article to explore the methodology of the corruption perception surveys, but my
own fieldwork in Niger has caused me to be skeptical on two grounds. First, I have encountered
Nigerien and American NGO officials engaged in anti-corruption programs in Niamey who
openly discuss the need to manipulate the public's perception of corruption by means of media
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can glance at a chart and see that New Zealand is perceived to be the
least corrupt country in the world while Somalia is the most corrupt.' 8 5
Niger is ranked as number 123 out of 180 countries measured, not bad
compared to many other sub-Saharan African countries.' 86
As corruption became an important issue for Western aid agencies
through the 1990s and 2000s, certain common prescriptions emerged.
For example, many Western financed anti-corruption programs focused
on paring back poor countries' civil services to limit the number of
functionaries possessing sufficient discretionary power to extract rents
from citizens. 1' In addition to shrinking the civil service, anticorruption programs promoted the reform of civil service rules so that
positions would be granted based on merit rather than patronage.
Poor countries' government procurement systems were also a frequent
target of corruption reforms. 9 Procurement fraud is the major source of
corruption in Niger and across the developing world, and many
countries including Niger have passed laws intended to create efficiency
and transparency in those systems. 190 Finally, many Western-funded
anti-corruption programs focus on enhancing the enforcement and
punishment of corrupt behavior. One aspect of this push for
enforcement is engendering a free press that will bring instances of
corruption to the attention of the public and legal authorities.191 Another
blitzes coupled with officially (but quietly) imposed temporary moratoria on petty corruption.
See Interview with an American NGO Consultant, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Interview with American NGO Consultant] (on file with author) (discussing the need for a
media blitz and temporary moratorium in order to rescue a foundering U.S.-funded anticorruption program); see also Hendrix, supra note 179, at 4 (arguing that governmental
corruption cannot be addressed without acknowledging corruption within NGOs). The NGO
officials implement this strategy when they need a bump in their corruption index scores so that
their anti-corruption contracts will be renewed. See Interview with American NGO Consultant,
supra. Stated plainly, the players have learned to game the perception-based anti-corruption
system. Second, even if anti-corruption NGO and government shenanigans did not exist, I doubt
that the perceptions of citizens from different countries are truly comparable. In Niger, most
people are resigned to the existence of corruption in their daily lives. They are so inured to it
that they do not perceive it as a particular problem. I question whether the same would be true in
other less corrupt parts of the world. See generally Dreher & Schneider, supra note 128, at 3
(questioning the validity of corruption perception surveys).
185.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Corruption PerceptionsIndex 2010, at 2-3 (2010),

http://www.locationselector.com/images/stories/featured reports/CPIreport ForWeb.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Lambsdorff, supra note 184, at 5; see ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 42-59 (describing anti-corruptions programs' efforts to
privatize industry as a means of shrinking government and eliminating discretion).
188.

ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 69-71.

189. Id. at 59.
190. See infra Part V.B. 1.
191. See Lambsdorff, supra note 184, at 40 (reporting studies that show high correlation
between vibrant free press and low levels of corruption). It is beyond the scope of this Article to
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is the reform of developing countries' law enforcement systems,
including the promulgation of clear and strict laws defining and
punishing corruption and the training and cajoling of judicial authorities
(who are often corrupt)' 92 to persuade them to enforce the new anticorruption laws.' 9 3
B. What is Meant by "Corruption"?
In the literature on corruption in the developing world, each
academic paper and each aid report seems to adopt its own particular
definition of corrupt behavior. It would require pages to catalogue them,
but this Article will highlight two definitional points. First, it adopts an
anthropological approach in that it considers its subject matter to be a
generalized culture, or "complex" of corruption. Second, this Article
focuses on "petty" as opposed to "grand" corruption.
Because economists tend to quantify human interactions, and
because it is difficult to know what to count and not to count in the
absence of bright lines, their definitions of corruption often attempt to
distinguish between illicit corruption on one hand and culturally
appropriate gift-giving behavior on the other.194 Anthropologists, in
contrast, generally believe that bright line definitions fail to capture the
explore the role of the free press in combating corruption, but my findings from Niger indicate
that there are at least two problems with relying on the press. First, the press itself is subject to
corruption. Niger is rife with stories of newspaper reporters and owners who accept payment in
exchange for squelching stories of corruption and other misbehavior. Interview with the Former
Director General of a Private Radio Station (Feb. 26, 1999), supra note 27. Second, even where
the press pursues corruption stories, powerful political actors often ensure that no prosecutorial
agency pursues the information. Often, when a newspaper publishes an expos6 of corrupt
practices, the end result is that the government actors go free and the newspaper reporter or
publisher is sued and convicted of defamation or illegally obtaining secret information. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2009 Human Rights Report: Niger (Mar. 11, 2010), available at

http://niamey.usembassy.gov/2009 nigerhrr.html (describing several instances where journalists
were jailed after reporting on government corruption). But see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
2010 Human Rights Report: Niger 11 (Apr. 8, 2011) (reporting that "[alfter Tandja was
deposed, independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of views without
restriction"), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160138.pdf.
192.

See ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 153-56.

193. See id. at 68, 151-55 (discussing the importance of consistent enforcement of clear
criminal laws in combating corruption); see also Lambsdorff,supra note 184, at 40 (arguing that
a corrupt judiciary that lets the "big fish" go free is strongly correlated with more corruption);
see generally Hendrix, supra note 179, at 3 (summarizing the anti-corruption policy package as
administrative simplification, reform of state procurement and financial management, tax,
customs and budget systems, providing access to information systems, stronger and more
independent judiciaries, audit offices, and independent media and civil society oversight).
194.

See ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 9; see also

Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xvii (defining corruption as a private individual or firm
paying a public official in return for a benefit).
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peculiarities of corruption in the contexts of particular cultures.19 5
Rather than attempting to draw lines between gift giving and corruption,
anthropologists refer to a more generalized "complex of corruption" that
includes the outright payment of bribes in exchange for the provision of
government benefits but also includes all of the gift-giving, favoritism
and influence peddling that might escape quantification-and
sanction-under the economists' narrower definition.' 96 This Article
shares anthropologists' more flexible definition: gift-giving, favoritism,
and influence peddling are among the many strategies for gaining
favorable access to governmental services and they must be understood
as part of the complex of corruption even if they would not be counted
as corruption in a survey or explicitly sanctioned by an anti-corruption

law.1 97
Though economists and anthropologists tend to disagree on the exact
definition of corrupt behavior, they agree that there is an essential
difference between "petty" and "grand" corruption. When Westerners
think of corruption, particularly in an African context, they often
envision rapacious dictators who bleed their countries dry of valuable
natural resources and shelter their ill-gotten gains in Swiss bank
accounts.198 Over the past thirty years, dozens of politicians and military
leaders have fit that general description, with Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko
as the prototype and Gabon's recently deceased president, Omar
Bongo-with his villas on the French Riviera and his family's fleet of
luxury automobiles-as a recent prominent example. 199 This brand of
195. See Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 12 (arguing that anthropology is better
suited than other disciplines to the study of petty corruption because it "can assess shaded
areas").
196. Id. at 5; see Interview with Manager of a Rental Car Business, in Niamey, Niger (Feb.
24, 2009) (on file with author) (explaining that it is vital for businessmen in Niamey to have
friends in high places and pulling out a three-ring binder to display dozens of business cards
from government ministers and others highly placed in Niger's government); Interview with
Seller, supra note 95 (saying one has to have friends if one wants to do business in Niger, and
that giving people envelopes stuffed with money is one way of making friends).
197. See Interview with Manager of Rental Car Business, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 2, 2009)
(on file with author) (explaining that it is not necessary to pay explicit bribes to police if one
regularly gives them gifts and then asks for favors in return).
198. See Howard W. French, An Anatomy of Autocracy: Mobutu's Era, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/world/an-anatomy-of-autocracymobutu-s-era.html?pagewanted=all&srcypm (discussing the massive, legendary state corruption
in the former Zaire).
199. See id. at 1 (discussing the Mobutu era and its corruption); Adam Nossiter,
Underneath PalatialSkin, Corruption Rules Gabon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, available at
President
(reporting
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/africa/15libreville.html
Bongo's "66 bank accounts, 183 cars, 39 luxury properties in France . . . ."); Adam Nossiter,
Omar Bongo, Gabon Leader, Dies at 73, N.Y TIMES, June 9, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/africa/09bongo.html (mentioning Bongo's "dozens
of luxurious properties around Paris, a $500 million presidential palace, [and] fancy cars").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

35

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

36

[Vol. 24

"grand corruption" 200 exists in Niger, but it tends not to be so eyepopping, gerhaps because of the country's dearth of exploitable natural
resources. o1 Instead, "petty corruption"20 2 furnishes the rules of the
game for businesses in Niger and indeed for most social, legal,
economic, and political transactions.203 Petty corruption in Niger-the
payment of gifts or bribes in association with virtually any official or
quasi official interaction-is constant and varied. The examples
discussed in Part V.B focus on bribery and fraud in government
procurement, and on specific methods for cheating on taxes and

customs duties. 204
C. What's Wrong with a Little Corruption?
This Article argues that petty corruption supplies the rules of the
game for businesses in Niger. If corruption supplies rules, and if
everyone understands them, one might legitimately ask whether it is
such a bad thing. Indeed, some scholars, particularly in the 1960s and
1970s, characterized corruption in the developing world as a healthy
reaction to overly complicated and repressive government
regulations, 205 as grease that caused muddled government bureaucracies
200. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xix (defining the term "grand corruption").
201. There is some indication that grand corruption is beginning to blossom in Niger as its
oil industry grows. The Chinese have been particularly active in Nigerien oil exploration. Before
Niger's unpopular president Tanja was overthrown in a coup d'dtat in early 2010, general
speculation and some news reports indicated that the Chinese were not only bankrolling Tanja's
political machine, but also paying large amounts of cash directly to him. See generally Adam
Nossiter, After a Coup, Niger Resumes Business as Usual with China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/world/africa/25niger.html?pagewanted
=all (referring to a $300 million "signing bonus" the Chinese paid to the Nigerien government
under a secretive oil deal, as well as a $6.6 million payment into an account directly controlled
by President Tanja).
202. See Elliott, supra note 179, at 175, 178 (employing the term "petty corruption" and
arguing it occurs when private actors interact with non-elected governmental officials,
particularly lower-level administrative bureaucrats); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xvii,
xviii (referring to "low level" corruption and stating that it usually occurs where a public benefit
or cost exists and officials have discretion to assign it to applications); Mushtaq H. Kahn,
Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic
Analysis [hereinafter Kahn], in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 220 (employing

the term "petty corruption" and noting that the poor and powerless are most often its victims;
Hendrix, supra note 179, at 2, 4 (employing the term "administrative corruption" to refer to the
same phenomenon).
203. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 5 (arguing everyday corruption in Africa is
pervasive and guided by a complete, complex set of rules and expectations); see Interview with
Manager of Rental Car Business, supra note 197 (explaining that it is not necessary to pay
explicit bribes to police if one regularly gives them gifts and then asks for favors in return).
204. See infra Part V.B.2.
205. Lambsdorff, supra note 184, at 4.
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to move more efficiently.206 In a similar vein, some scholars argued that
corruption was a rational reaction-or even a heroic example of popular
resistance-to the deviant practices of predatory post-Independence
states.2 07
However the consensus among contemporary scholars is that
corruption causes more problems than it solves. Some point out that as a
matter of common sense if users of government services rely on
corruption in the form of bribes as grease to make the system work
more efficiently, the bribes create an incentive for the government's
petty bureaucrats to create more delays so that they will have more
opportunities to collect bribes, or "speed money" as it is sometimes
called.2 0 8
Corruption also leads to inefficient policy decisions, since public
goods are allocated to those who have sufficient capital to pay bribes

206. Mark Pieth, InternationalCooperation to Combat Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 120; see Ray Fisman & Roberta Gatti, Bargainingfor
Bribes: The Role of Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 127

(referencing a 1968 study by Huntington that referred to petty corruption as a form of
"personalized de-regulation"). It is far beyond the scope of this Article to resolve the question of
what causes corruption in the developing world and why corruption seems particularly prevalent
across Africa. Some point to poverty itself as a major cause of corruption in Africa. In the most
common version of this story, African countries are too poor to pay their bureaucrats living
wages so they are forced to supplement their incomes through rent-seeking behavior. See ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 65. But see Giorgio Blundo,

Corruptionin Africa and the Social Sciences: A Review of the Literature[hereinafter Blundo],
in EVERYDAY CORRUPTION, supra note 26, at 61-64 (mentioning studies that conclude that

raising salaries does not work in an atmosphere of rampant corruption); Lambsdorff, supra note
184, at 39 (claiming that studies of the link between low salaries and corruption have been
inconclusive). Others explain corruption as a legacy of colonialism. According to this view,
Africans generally dislike state institutions and view them as legitimate objects of plunder
because the colonial state was alien and unjust. See Blundo, supra, at 38 (arguing that African
peoples' notion of their relationship to the state was formed by the coercion, violence and
corruption of the colonial era). Still others see roots of contemporary African corruption in its
rural cultural traditions, particularly the fact that patriarchs and others with access to resources
are obligated to provide for their extended families and villages. Id. at 26. See generally Kelley,
supra note 15, at 1006-08 (describing the patriarchal social structure of the Zarma people of
Niger). A further common explanation of African corruption blames the Western aid industry
itself. Aid projects, including business formalization and anti-corruption programs, account for a
significant percentage of public expenditures in the poorest of African countries. Blundo, supra,
at 57 (stating 90% of public investment and 30% of ongoing state expenses in sub-Saharan
Africa come from foreign aid). The projects are, practically without fail, rife with corruption.
See id.; see Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103 (claiming that Nigerien
ministries tend to squash innovative business formalization programs proposed by Nigerien
businessmen because they want to keep the NGO gravy for themselves).
207. Blundo, supra note 206, at 20.
208. Kahn, supra note 202, at 220-21; see infra note 270 (describing how Nigerien
bureaucrats sometimes sell speed rather than the service itself).
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rather than the most efficient producers.209 The individuals and firms
that receive corrupt government contracts are often either unqualified to
carry out the required tasks, are permitted by their corrupt collaborators
within the government to skimp on quality, or both. o Rather than
serving the needs of citizens, public investment funds end up paying for
roads that crumble, buildings that fall down, and factories that produce
goods that no one wants. 1 In the terminology of economists, the
corrupt transactions produce a "deadweight loss" for society.212
In addition to its inefficiencies, corruption exacerbates unfairness in
developing countries because it favors the interests of haves over the
have-nots. 13 In societies where citizens must bribe governmental
officials to obtain services from the state, only those who are already
wealthy or are connected to wealth and power have the means. 2 14 The
result is that developing countries' strained, often ineffective social
service networks are unable to deliver services to the poor.215
Finally, some argue that corruption harms developing countries by
impeding democratization.216 The public in developing democracies
comes to believe that government is for sale to the highest bidder,2 17 and
that market based economic systems, dragged down by the
inefficiencies described above, are unworkable. 2 They begin to yearn
for the comparatively less corrupt,219 economically predictable systems
that preceded democratization.
209. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xix.
210. Second Interview with Owner, supra note 137 (explaining how procurement
corruption works and stating that the businessman usually tenders fewer goods than stated in the
contract or goods of inferior quality); see Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of
Corruption [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy), in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 42 (noting that corrupt firms and individuals that receive
government contracts often skimp on quality).
211.

See ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 3; see

Pieth, supra note 206, at 121 (noting that some corrupt governments organize huge public works
projects for the sole purpose of graft, leaving the next generation to pay).
212. Kahn, supranote 202, at 221 (employing the term "deadweight loss").
213. Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 210, at 33.
214. See id. at 42 (arguing that corruption distributes a country's wealth to insiders and
corrupt bidders).
215. Hendrix, supra note 179, at 5; see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xvi, xix (arguing
that policymakers should consider the negative effects that corruption has on poor citizens
dependent on the state for assistance).
216. Hendrix, supra note 179, at 5.
217. Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210, at 45.
218. See Glynn et al., supra note 178, at 8.
219. See infra note 249 (discussing the alleged link between democratization and increased
corruption).
220. There is disagreement among scholars-particularly economists-over whether
corruption harms countries by impeding overall economic growth. Rose-Ackerman, Political
Economy, supra note 210, at xvi. Some studies conclude yes, others no. According to Susan
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III. CORRUPTION SUPPLIES THE RULES OF THE GAME FOR
NIGER'S BUSINESSES

A. Corruption in Nigerien Society

In the realm of government, everything is for sale in Niger. Within
the government bureaucracy, there are lucrative posts and there are
"dry" posts and everyone knows which is which. Police and customs
jobs are particularly valued because they involve frequent interactions
with end users and thus frequent opportunities for rent extraction. 222
Likewise, positions within certain government ministries, such as the
Ministries of Health and Education, are particularly sought after
because they purchase large quantities of hospital and school supplies
and each such transaction creates an opportunity for individual
enrichment.2 2 3 In contrast, few want to work for or do business with
Niger's Foreign Service because, though it provides opportunities for
living comparatively comfortably in far away countries, it buys little in
the way of materials and there are few opportunities for rapid
accumulation of wealth by means of corrupt practices.2 24
There is fierce competition among Nigerien functionaries for the
more lucrative posts 22 5 and that competition has given rise to a lively
market in which higher level functionaries sell government positions to
Rose-Ackerman, the doyenne of corruption studies, the bottom line is that corruption is
associated with lack of economic development-that is, they often appear together-but
causation is unclear. Id.; Kahn, supra note 202, at 218. As she and others point out, however, the
world includes numerous examples of countries that have enjoyed strong economic growth in
spite of rampant corruption. See id. at 216-17; see also Kahn, supra note 202, at 187 (noting that
most developing countries suffer from endemic corruption but that some grow much faster than
others).
221. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 89.
222. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 73 (stating
that positions in police departments are coveted because of opportunities to engage in
corruption); Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210, at 32 (stating that customs and
tax collectors are particularly notorious for corruption).
223. Interview with a Seller, supra note 95 (specifying that the best opportunities for graft
often arise from the various "services" that are attached to government ministries, and
identifying the best ministries as Education, Public Health, Transportation and Defense).
224.

ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 73. But see

Interview with a Former Employee of Niger's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Niamey, Niger
(Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Former Employee] (on file with author) (describing
his experience with certain "standard" corrupt purchasing practices within Foreign Affairs).
225. See Interview with an Employee of Niger's Tax Service, supra note 130 (expressing
frustration that the lucrative posts, promotions, and opportunities for professional training within
the service always went to the prot6gds and family members of powerful Ministry officials); see
also Interview with an Nigerien Customs Official, supranote 29 (explaining that his job was to
travel around the interior of the country to perform customs inspections but that he was in
Niamey seeking to mobilize political influence to receive a transfer to a better post).
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lower level functionaries, sometimes for a lump sum, sometimes for
monthly rent.2 26 The lower level functionaries who successfully produce
wealth from their positions, and who regularly send wealth upstream to
their superiors, are rewarded with ever-more lucrative positions.227
Those who fail to produce wealth or who display a lack of loyalty to
their superiors or a reluctance to go along with the corrupt program are
subject to "administrative banishment," 8 meaning they are stuck in
lower-level positions without opportunities for supplementing their
salaries, passed over for promotion and training opportunities, and,
more often than not, forced to work in field offices far from their homes
and families. Nigerien functionaries grimly joke about being sent to
Diffa-a windswept city in the far eastern part of Niger-if they fail to
go along with their superiors' schemes for personal enrichment.
Corruption in Niger can be quite blunt. Bureaucrats who wield
sufficient power sometimes engage in the straightforward extraction of
rents. The most notorious of these are the gendarmes and customs
agents who set up armed unofficially authorized checkpoints by the
side of Niger's highways.230 All commercial vehicles are obliged to stop
and all must pay what is in essence a quasi-official toll before
231
continuing. Drivers who complain, or skimp on the bribe, are ordered
to unload their vehicles by the side of the road, a process that can take

hours. 232
Corrupt practices in Niger are guided by their own practical rules
and customs. 233 In many cases, the amount of the appropriate bribe is
known to all.2 34 When a commercial truck driver is stopped by a

226. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 82 (stating
that in corrupt government hierarchies, payment to superiors becomes essentially a rent to hold
on to lower level positions).
227. Id
228. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 90.
229. See Interview with an Employee of Niger's Tax Service, supra note 130 (discussing
administrative banishment). In explaining the banishment problem, Nigerien functionaries
sometimes use the French term limoger, which is translated by most dictionaries as "to dismiss"
but derives historically from French bureaucrats' fear that they would be administratively
banished to the reputedly backward and isolated city of Limoges, France.
230. See Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 77 (referring to the itinerant customs
inspectors as "flying squads"); see also Arifari, supra note 136, at 180 (claiming the roads in
Niger, Senegal and Benin are "dens of routine and highly visible institutionalized corruption").
231. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 77.
232. Many times I have traveled around Niger in quasi-public "bush taxies" that were
stopped by gendarmes. In the few instances that the chauffeur refused to pay, all passengers
were ordered to take their luggage and their goods off of the roof and stand for inspection.
233. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 84.
234. See Giorgio Blundo, An Ordered Corruption? The Social World of Public
Procurement,in EVERYDAY CORRUPTION, supranote 26, at 229 (arguing that corruption in West
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gendarme, he and all other drivers will know that the price is 2000 CFA
(approximately $4) to pass. Often, the climate of corruption is so
pervasive and the corrupt practice so routine that no explicit demands
are required. 235
Corrupt practices are also generally governed by norms that
For example, if there is a
determine fair play within the system.
particular stretch of Nigerien highway that usually has a gendarme stop
on it that costs the commercial drivers 2000 CFA, 237 but on a particular
day a rival group of corrupt government officials (say, from the
Customs Service) sets up a second "flying patrol," the gendarmes will
temporarily reduce their prices until the other stop disappears, thereby
ensuring that the truckers do not have to pay more than the customary
price. 238
In sum, petty corruption is the rule, not the exception in Niger. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that small businessmen are
compelled to engage in it, as described in the following part.
B. Corruptionin Niger's Business Sector
1. Corruption in Public Purchasing Contracts as a Source of
Expansion Capital
Proprietors of small businesses in Niger struggle to obtain capital to
expand their enterprises. 239 They aspire to move up the commercial
chain from retail to wholesale, usually by mounting international
purchasing expeditions. 240 However, unless the businessmen are
connected to wealthy families,241 their only hope of obtaining a
financial windfall large enough to finance their expeditions is to engage
242
in corrupt transactions with the government. In a country where the
economy is dominated by subsistence farming and animal husbandry,2 4 3
Africa is govemed by unwritten rules and that the businessman who receives a contract and fails
to pay an appropriate bribe will not receive another).
235. Michael Johnston, Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy:
When Politics and Corruption Meet, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supranote 19,

at 62.
236. Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 84; see Arifari, supra note 136, at 179
(illustrating an instance of fair play among corrupt officials).
237. Arifari, supra note 136, at 197 (explaining that most experienced drivers know
exactly how much each official at each roadside stop is permitted his superiors to extract, and
that such extractions are generally viewed as a toll based on agreed upon charges).
238. Id. at 179; Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 77.
239. See supra Part II1.B.2.b.
240. Id.
241. See Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139.
242. See id. (stating Niger's government is the only source for expansion capital).
243.

See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 469 (2010), available at
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244

and where
where there are few commercial enterprises of any size,
the banking and finance sector is moribund,2 4 5 the government, which
purchases comparatively large quantities of goods and services, is the
only game in town.24 6
To gain the financing they need, ambitious businessmen seek to
form symbiotic, corrupt relationships with government officials who
purchase goods and services on behalf of government ministries or the
various services attached to those ministries. 247 They work their
networks of kinship, friendship, 248 and to an increasing degree, political
party affiliation, 2 hoping to identify officials on the inside of
(describing Niger's
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html
economy as agrarian and subsistence).
244. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. See id. (explaining that the government accounts for a large percentage of Niger's
economic activity).
247. See supra notes 95, 222-24 and accompanying text (explaining that some ministries
are more desirable objects of corruption than others). Although most of the businessmen I
interviewed had trades or businesses that they hoped to expand by obtaining government
procurement contracts, some businessmen have no particular business other than chasing such
contracts. No matter what the government wants to purchase, they will offer to supply it. See
Interview with Seller, supra note 95 (explaining that his true vocation is chasing procurement
contracts of any sort); Interview with Manager of a Rental Car Business, supra note 196 (saying
he spent several years doing nothing but chasing public procurement contracts). They spend
much of their time hanging around the hallways of ministries cultivating new friends and
searching for opportunities. See Interview with Seller, supra note 95 (saying "knowing people"
is the key to his business).
248. See Interview with Seller, supra note 95 (demonstrating how he roams the hallways
of government ministries-on the day of the interview, the Ministry of Commerce-greeting
friends and acquaintances and looking for opportunities).
249. See Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (complaining bitterly
that one cannot obtain government contracts, and thus expansion capital, without being involved
in party politics). Some commentators link recent increases in corruption with the rise of party
politics in post-Cold War Africa. Blundo, supra note 206, at 53. In the 1960s and 70s, African
strongmen leaders ruled their countries through a combination of carrots and sticks: carrots in
the form of personal patronage doled out to loyal supporters, sticks in the form of physical
violence and arbitrary detention perpetrated against perceived political enemies. See Leonardo
A. Villal6n & Abdourahmane Idrissa, Repetitive Breakdowns and a Decade ofExperimentation:
InstitutionalChoices and Unstable Democracy in Niger, in THE FATE OF AFRICA's DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENTS: ELITEs AND INSTITUTiONS 27-33 (Leonardo A. Villal6n & Peter Von Doepp eds.,

2005) (describing Niger's attempts to transition to democratic governance). But beginning in the
late 1980s, many strongmen leaders were pressured by international and domestic actors into
democratic reforms, which made it difficult to rely on violence and terror to stay in office. See
generally id. Peter Von Doepp & Leonardo A. Villal6n, Elites, Institutions, and the Varied
Trajectories of Africa's Third Wave Democracies (referring to the fact that post-Cold War
African governments were forced to adopt good governance reforms). The leaders quickly
learned that the only effective tool they had left for illegitimately remaining in power was the
personal patronage network. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xix; see Rose-Ackerman,
Political Economy, supra note 210, at 45 (noting that corrupt governments do not have to
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government who have discretion and power over purchasing, and who
will adopt the businessman into their stable of corrupt collaborators.
Once the relationship has been formed, the insider steers valuable
government purchasing contracts toward the chosen businessman. 250
The businessman who has been favored by the corrupt official must in
turn split the ill-gotten profits with that insider.25 1 If the system of
corruption is working well, both the insider and the businessman will
prosper. 252
The specific methods employed by the businessmen and their
corrupt government collaborators are varied and ever evolving, but
several are considered standard practice.25 3 One is to avoid scrutiny by
segmenting purchasing contracts into small units that are not subject to
public bidding regulations. 254 Under present law, any government
purchase of goods or services of a value less than 5 million CFA
depend on consent by the governed and instead maintain power through corrupt patronage
networks). Stated simply, political leaders no longer wielded the stick of terror, so they had to
spend much more money to persuade followers to get in line behind them. Id.; see also Kahn,
supra note 202, at 231 (arguing that post-Cold War political parties in Africa realized that
staying in power required transmitting resources to powerful constituents through patron-client
networks, and that corruption increased as a result). They therefore cultivated wealthy
supporters, particularly in the business sector, who in turn secretly funded the leaders' political
parties by engaging in the large-scale distribution of cash to potential voters and party loyalists.
Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 71; see also Interview with Young Owner of Metal
Fabrication Business, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with author) (claiming that
participation in party politics is one of the only routes to success in business). In some instances,
the politicians and political parties actually used governmental resources to create wealthy
business people, whom they then employed as conduits for creating and transferring cash to
expand their political power. See Second Interview with Owner, supra note 137 (pointing to a
wealthy businessman on the street in Niamey and saying that he had been "created" by former
President Barre as a means of financing elections and patronage payments). As these networks
of political party corruption took shape, even petty bribes from the lowest reaches of the state
bureaucracy became integrated into organized systems of cash extraction and distribution used
to favor political allies and build campaign war chests. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at xix. In
short, according to this theory, corruption in post-Cold War Africa has become a mode of
staying in power and has become a sort of cement that binds ruling elites from the political and
business sectors together. Blundo, supra note 206, at 51.
250. See Blundo, supra note 234, at 228 (stating that each decision-maker inside
government has "his" businessmen whom he can count on).
251. Second Interview with Owner, supra note 137 (providing a general description of
how procurement corruption works); see also Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's
Shoes, supra note 151 (stating that businessmen must always pass the "envelope" back to the
government insider); Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (same).
252. Second Interview with Owner, supra note 137.
253. Interview with a Former Employee, supra note 224 (referring to "standard" methods
of corrupt purchasing within the ministry).
254. Blundo, supra note 234, at 233-34; see also Interview with Young Owner of Metal
Fabrication Business, supra note 249 (referring to the practice of segmenting government
purchasing contracts to avoid scrutiny).
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(approximately $10,000) can be entered into without a public bidding
process.255 Therefore, businessmen and their corrupt collaborators
inside of government simply break their $30,000 dollar contracts into
three segments and proceed quietly with their transactions.256
A businessman's profits on a $10,000 purchasing contract are
typically quite low, 257 even if he and his inside collaborator employ the
usual profit-boosting (and doubly corrupt) method of agreeing that the
quantity and quality of the tendered goods will be less than required by
the terms of the purchasing contract. 25 Once the businessman has
purchased and shipped the goods, and then shared as much as half of his
profits with his inside collaborator, he might clear less than $1,000.259
But businessmen typically need much larger amounts of cash to mount
their international purchasing expeditions, so they are anxious whenever
possible to enter into large scale purchasing contracts that should, at
least in theory, be subject to the full panoply of public bidding

regulations. 260
Where the purchasing contract is too large to avoid a public bidding
process, Nigeriens employ numerous methods to circumvent public
bidding laws and the attendant public scrutiny so that they can engage
in corrupt transactions. One straight-forward technique is that the
government insider-if he has access to privileged information
regarding competing bids-simply passes that information to his
businessman on the outside, who adjusts his bid accordingly. 26 1 The
insider might require an up-front payment from the businessman, plus a
255. See Blundo, supra note 234, at 227-32.
256. Id. at 233; see also Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139
(discussing his recent receipt of a procurement contract for computer paper in an amount just
under 5 million CFA).
257. Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139 (describing his urgent need
for expansion capital and ruing the fact that the only purchasing contract he had obtained-for
$10,000 worth of copy paper-was too small to provide significant profits).
258. See Pieth, supra note 206, at 121 (stating that corruption leads the government to
purchase inadequate equipment); see also Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210,
at 42 (stating that corrupt actors in government purchasing often increase their profits by
skimping on quality).
259. See Interview with Manager of Rental Car Business, supra note 196 (saying he spent
years chasing public purchasing contracts but saying it was hard to generate significant profits
because the corrupt insiders take the majority of profits for themselves); Interview with the
Owner of an Auto Parts Shop Near the New Market, supra note 172 (describing his corrupt
purchasing transactions with officials of the Ministry of Defense and stating that it is hard to
make reasonable profits on the transactions when so much has to be turned over to the insiders).
260. See Mar. 1, 2008 Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151
(explaining the need for expansion capital and bemoaning that small government procurement
contracts, though welcome, did not provide sufficient capital); see also Mar. 3, 2009 Interview
with Young Man, supranote 139 (explaining a similar need).
261. See Blundo, supra note 234, at 241 (mentioning the practice of government insiders
leaking privileged bidding information to their outside business collaborators).
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share of the downstream profits once the purchasing transaction is
complete. 262 In a slight variation, the government insider may wield
sufficient power within the ministry to simply override or fix the public
bidding process by ordering his underlings to choose his favored
businessman.2 63
Even where the insider lacks decisive power, he can employ proven
methods for steering contracts toward favored bidders, all of which
involve limiting the information that goes to the public and sharing as
much information as possible with corrupt collaborators. For example, a
government official in charge of purchasing materials for his ministry
can minimize or eliminate competition for public contracts by giving his
collaborator advance word on upcoming bids while waiting until the last
minute to publicly advertise the bids. 264 Alternatively, the corrupt
official can withhold from the public vital information necessary to a
successful bid while ensuring that the favored businessman receives that
information.265 Similarly, corrupt ministry officials can withhold from
all but their chosen businessmen the documents necessary to formally
bid on a contract. 266 Finally, a corrupt ministry official can
painstakingly craft the wording of a public tender offer so narrowly that
only his preferred business collaborators can possibly qualify. 267
Where reformers try to limit this panoply of corrupt practices by
establishing review committees to scrutinize the propriety of contracting
and bidding procedures, the tainted insiders either use their influence to
stack the committees with friends, relatives and party partisans, 2 6 8 or, if
the committee members are independent, intimidate them by applying
political pressure. 2 69 If the financial prize is large enough, the corrupt
262. See Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 73 (stating that corrupt payments to
government insiders sometimes take the form of a fixed payment plus an ongoing rent); see
generally Interview with the Owner of an Auto Parts Shop Near the New Market, supra note
172 (discussing a corrupt transaction with the Department of Defense where he was compelled
to turn over most of his profits to government insiders).
263. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 210, at 34-35.
264. Blundo, supra note 234, at 241.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 240.
267. Id. at 243.
268. See Hendrix, supra note 179, at 12 (discussing the difficulty of combating corruption
when both the agents and principals are in on it and the fact that incremental corruption reforms
risk being "hijacked by corrupt elites").
269. See supra notes 225-26, 249 and accompanying discussion (discussing the rise of
party politics and politician's use of administrative banishment to control civil servants). There
is a somewhat less common but still renowned method of employing political power to skirt
purchasing regulations. If a politician is prominent enough, he can establish a "special fund."
These funds are typically earmarked for appealing purposes such as stimulating literacy for
young women or combating childhood diseases. Because the funds' aims are so urgent, and
because the normal government purchasing strictures are known to be cumbersome, the high
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official can simply buy the committee members off with shares of the
proceeds.2 70
Party politics play an increasingly important role in shaping the rules
of the game of business-government corruption. 271 Businessmen who
wish to win government contracts can no longer rely exclusively on ties
of kinship or friendship or mere mutual advantage: to an increasing
degree, they must approach with ties of political party affiliation.2
Residents of Niamey tell stories of once obscure businessmen who have
become wealthy and powerful through government purchasing contracts
tied to party politics. 73 The dominant role of party affiliation increases
the deadweight loss to society because, to an increasing extent, men
with limited talent and experience but strong political connections are
awarded important public contracts. Illiterate sheep herders win
contracts to purchase and service thousands of computers that they do
not even know how to turn on.274 Men who have spent their careers as
official receives unfettered discretion to spend the money for the stated purposes. Blundo, supra
note 234, at 237. The politician and his corrupt collaborators are then relatively free to enrich
themselves. See Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103 (referring to the
abuse of special accounts, including former President Tanja's special fund for building rural
schools).
270. Blundo, supra note 234, at 244. Some less common methods for circumventing anticorruption rules rely on deft action taken by the businessmen doing the bidding. For example,
businessmen who have connections within ministries will form public procurement tontines
where they collude to create the semblance of a public bid process but where they agree that
they will rotate actually winning the bids. Id. at 245. In another twist, they sometimes create
fictitious companies that put in bogus high bids so that the winner in a bid competition is the
only real company involved. Id. There are many other forms of government corruption in Niger
that this Article does not explore in detail because they do not bear as directly on Niger's
business sector. For example, government bureaucrats routinely sell services that they are
supposed to provide for free. Blundo, supranote 206, at 74. In somewhat of a twist, government
bureaucrats sometimes sell speed rather than the good or service itself. See Interview with A
Former Employee of Niger's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 224 (recalling that when
he worked for the Ministry, he would routinely extract bribes for expediting payment to
merchants who had already earned the money through complete performance); Mar. 1, 2009
Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151 (claiming that business transactions
involving the government go much faster if you pay a bribe or have friends on the inside who
can speed the process). Still other bureaucrats invent unofficial, ex-post regulatory hurdles, or
suddenly decide to zealously enforce regulatory or criminal laws that historically have been
ignored. Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210, at 39. Perhaps most galling to end
users of government services, bureaucrats behave arbitrarily or ambiguously and thereby create
a demand for clarity that they must pay for. Id.
271. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
272. See id.; Feb. 23, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 103 (expressing distaste
for the new rules of the game that require businesspeople to be active in political parties).
273. See supra note 249; see also Blundo, supra note 234, at 249 (offering an example of a
small business owner who became fabulously successful as a result of a Prime Minister's
support).
274. Mar. 2, 2009 Interview with Young Man, supra note 139; see Blundo, supra note
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tailors but who became active in party politics end up in charge of
constructing large government buildings. 275 The government pays
higher than necessary rices for goods and services that are often of
inferior quality and,
even more troubling, pays for equipment
(including medical equipment) that does not work, and buildings and
roads that crumble.27 7
Following these rules of the game, the proprietors of small
businesses in Niamey vie for expansion capital from corrupt
government purchasing contracts. Those who succeed in establishing
corrupt collaborative relationships with government insiders prosper
and move up the chain from retail to wholesale. 2 78 Those who lack good
luck, as well as ties of family, friendship, or political affiliation, have
faint hope of prospering. 279
2. Avoiding Governmental Burdens and Maximizing Business Profits
by Employing Transiteursas Wholesale Brokers of Corruption
The preceding part described the corrupt government purchasing
transactions that small businessmen rely upon to accumulate sufficient
capital to mount their international buying expeditions. But
accumulating expansion capital by engaging in corrupt purchasing deals
with governmental insiders is not the only form of routine corruption
that Niger's businessmen rely upon. Another involves maximizing
profit margins by minimizing financial obligations owed to the state,
particularly in the form of taxes and customs duties.
For small-scale businessmen, this can mean the straightforward
234, at 248 (noting that unqualified winners of procurement bids will sometimes "sell" the
procurement contracts to more qualified and knowledgeable businessmen and that the usual split
in such arrangements is 50% of profits for the sheep seller who obtained the contract, 50% to the
person who actually does the work).
275. See Blundo, supra note 234, at 251.
276. Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210, at 42; see supra Part IV.C.
277. See Blundo, supra note 234, at 248 (arguing that businessmen who are completely
unqualified often receive the bids to carry out government purchasing and services); see also
Rose-Ackerman, Political Economy, supra note 210, at 42 (noting that corruption causes
government contracts to go to providers who are less efficient and who skimp on quality).
Reformers try to limit his sort of corruption and prevent dangerous conditions in public works
projects by establishing review boards to inspect and verify that public works have been
performed adequately. But the review boards, like all other government institutions, are simply
intimidated by political pressure or paid off in exchange for peremptorily approving the results
they were supposed to verify. Blundo, supra note 234, at 255.
278. See supra note 164; see also supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
279. See Interview with Seller of Fabric, supra note 164 (ruing that he has no such
connections and will never be able to move beyond his small retail stall); see generally Blundo,
supranote 234, at 256-57 (arguing that if a businessman wants to obtain expansion capital, there
is little alternative but to participate in corruption).
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negotiation with tax officials over the amount of taxation owed. In a
typical corrupt, tax avoiding transaction, a government tax collector
agrees to understate the amount that the business owes, and the
businessman then pays the official a percentage of the difference.280 For
businessmen that mount international purchasing expeditions, however,
there is a much more important and efficacious method for reducing the
state's share of business profits: the use of transiteurs, or transit
agents,281 who act as wholesale brokers of corruption.
If a Nigerien businessman were to follow the official rules of the
game, he would purchase his goods in a distant port, carry those goods
back to Niger's border (or pay someone else to do so) and then, upon
reaching Niamey, clear them through a customs depot. Before
proceeding to market, he would have to pay customs duties and value
added taxes on everything he had carried into the country. The amount
owed would depend on the customs category of the goods and upon
their value. This, however, is very rarely what happens.
Instead, the businessman purchases his goods in the foreign port and
immediately puts them in the hands of his preferred transiteur.82 Once
the goods have been turned over to the transiteur,the businessman need
not think about them further until they arrive at a lot adjacent to the
Grand Marchi in Niamey, having already cleared customs and owing
no further taxes.28 3 The businessman need not dicker with customs
agents regarding the classification of the goods 284 or fill out paperwork:
280. See Interview with the Owner of a Small Hotel and Several Bars, in Niamey, Niger
(Mar. 12, 2009) (on file with author) (claiming he constantly must bargain with tax collectors
over the amount of his payments); Interview with an Employee of Niger's Tax Service, supra
note 130 (claiming that no one pays full taxes and that the amounts depend largely on the
businessman's political influence and/or ability to bribe the tax collector).
281. At least one author refers to the transiteurs as "ambulant customs brokers." See
Arifari, supra note 136, at 187.
282. The various transiteurs in a given port compete with one another based on their
ability to deliver businessmen's goods quickly as well as their ability to minimize the customs
and taxation burdens placed on the businessman's goods. Each businessman has "his" transiteur
in a given port, but will switch to a competing transiteur if the competitor can produce better
results in terms of speed or price. Interview with the Owner of an Auto Parts Shop Near the
New Market, supra note 172 (explaining that he recently switched transiteurs and that the new
one is cheaper and faster); see also Mahaman Tidjani Alou, Etat, riseaux marchands et
mondialisation.Le cas des convois au Niger, 15 Les Nouveaux cahiers de l'Institut universitaire
d'6tudes du d6veloppement 125 (2004) [State, Market Networks and Globalization. For
Convoys in Niger, 15 The New Papers of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies 125
(2004)] (copy on file with author) (explaining that most merchants in Niger use transiteurs to
reduce expenses and avoid entanglement with the government).
283. Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151.
284. See Arifari, supra note 136, at 191 (explaining that many Nigerien businessmen
employ transiteurs-even when their businesses are formal and they have all the necessary
official paperwork-just to minimize the financial burdens and avoid the hassle of dealing with
the govemment).
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all of that has already been taken care of by the transiteur.285 The
businessman merely pays a flat fee in cash to the transiteur-a fee
based on the weight of the goods rather than their worth or customs
category, and typically much less than he would officially owe-and
goes on his merry way to sell them.28 6
Who are these transiteurs and how do they accomplish the feat of
transporting goods internationally while drastically cutting businessmen's taxation and customs burdens? Generally, they are men of great
287
many of whom were customs officials
wealth and political influence,
at some point in their past, who know how to manipulate, circumvent,
and undermine Niger's governmental bureaucracy. 288 They or their
agents can be found in ports where Nigeriens do business: West Africa
ports such as Cotounou, Lome, Abidjan and Dakar, as well as far flung
trading destinations such as Dubai and China. 289 They are also present
and active at all border points entering Niger. 29 0
Their method is to bundle together huge caravans of goods that
Nigerien businessmen have purchased in distant ports, and, before
initiating the transport of those goods, negotiate directly with Nigerien
The
customs officials to establish vastly discounted customs rates.
customs rates are typically based on volume rather than the
classification of the goods, and no one takes the time to look inside the
containers to see whether they are filled with diamonds or coal.2 92 Other
than the customs officials' steeply discounted estimation of the value of
the bundled goods, nothing concerning the transaction goes in writing293
285. Mar. 1, 2009 Interview with Seller of Women's Shoes, supra note 151 (saying his
transiteur takes care of the entire process of transporting the goods and shepherding them
through customs); see also Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144
(claiming he never deals with customs agents because he employs a transiteur who "arranges"
everything).
286. Interview with the Owner of an Auto Parts Shop Near the New Market, supra note
282 (claiming the amount of duty is calculated based on weight and that he has gotten a much
better deal since he switched to a transiteurwho has better connections).
287. Arifari, supra note 136, at 182 (arguing that smuggling is a systematic activity often
carried on by extremely influential actors).
288. See id. at 190 (stating transiteurs have strong contacts with the government and
understand the system, which permits them to act as intermediaries between the state and the
informal sector).
289. Id. at 189.
290. Id. at 190.
291. Id. at 199.
292. See id. (stating that customs duties are usually negotiated in bulk rather than by
category); see also Alou, supra note 282, at 133-35 (stating that the value of the goods is
irrelevant and that the cost to the businessman, as well as the size of the bribes paid to the
government officials, is typically based on the volume of the bundled goods in the caravan, and
that no one actually looks inside the boxes).
293. Arifari, supra note 136, at 213; see Alou, supra note 282, at 136 (stating the entire
transaction is paperless).
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and the entire business is transacted in cash.2 94
Customs officials are willing to participate in this system, of course,
because the transiteurs pay cash bribes to everyone up and down the
295
They maintain close personal,
governmental chain of command.
political and financial ties to prominent government officials, who send
the word down the line that they are not to be interfered with. In spite of
their strong influence among governmental leaders, they typically also
pay petty bribes to lower level customs officials who dot the convoys'
routes and guard the border crossings into Niger. When the convoy of
goods finally arrives in Niamey, the transiteursimply adds up his total
outlay for the steeply discounted customs and taxation payments, the
bribes paid, and the cost of transport adds his profit margin, and bills
the businessmen on a pro rata basis.29
Everyone is happy. The businessmen are happy to pay the
transiteursto exercise their connections, power and influence to reduce
customs and taxation burdens and to streamline the process of shipping
goods. The transiteurs themselves, along with corrupt government
collaborators high and low, are happy to divide the wealth produced by
vastly undercharging the businessmen. It is only the state-and the
citizens who depend on the state-that suffers by receiving only a
fraction of the desperately needed customs proceeds it should receive. 97
3. Impunity for Corrupt Practices
Customs duties account for more than half of Niger's budget 298
which helps explain why the damage caused by transiteurs is so
crippling to Niger's economy and, at the same time, why it is so
difficult to combat. Because the customs service produces so much of
the government's wealth, it wields inordinate power. If politicians even
hint at an investigation into the rampant corruption, the service can
threaten a slowdown or strike, which would mean certain financial
disaster for the state.2 99
Even if Nigerien officials' corrupt practices were revealed and
confronted, it would be extremely difficult to deter and punish them
because Niger's judicial system is notoriously dysfunctional and
corrupt. Economists who study corruption say that the cost of corrupt
294. Arifari, supra note 136, at 189.
295. See id. at 187 (arguing that corruption among customs officers generally reaches to
the top rungs of the government).
296. Alou, supranote 282, at 135.
297. See id. at 140 (explaining that the state receives some money but far less than it
would if the laws were enforced, because the negotiated duties are low and the transiteursand
corrupt officials each take a slice of the proceeds).
298. Arifari, supra note 136, at 184.
299. Id. at 184-85.
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activity to those who engage in it is the probability of being caught
times the probability of being convicted times the amount of
punishment levied.3 0 In Niger, the likelihood of being caught,
convicted and punished is exceedingly low.
One form of judicial corruption is linked to Niger's proto-democratic
party politics. 30 To an ever-increasing degree, the petty bureaucrat who
engages in corrupt practices has been placed in his lucrative position as
a result of his party loyalty. 302 If he has played by the rules and kicked a
share of his profits up the chain of corruption, he will be shielded from
accusation and prosecution by more powerful members of the political
network.3 0 3 If he is accused of corruption, a powerful party member will
phone the Minister of Justice, who in turn will Vhone the investigating
judge and tell him to make the case disappear. If the judge complies,
he is rewarded with cash and a promotion to a more lucrative position.
If he refuses, he finds himself in Diffa in short order. 305 Everyone in
Niger knows that the only time anyone is openly accused of and
prosecuted for corruption is if they step out of line and exhibit
disloyalty to higher political figures.30
Even where a bureaucrat accused of corruption lacks political ties,
he has little to fear as long as he has cash on hand because the Nigerien
justice system itself is notoriously corrupt from bottom to top. It is
common knowledge in Niger that one can be assured of prevailing in
any court action so long as the "judge's share" is sufficient. 308 If an
300. Rose-Ackerman, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 210, at 40.
301. See supra notes 249; see also supra text accompanying note 273.
302. See supra notes 225.
303. See generally Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144 (stating
that justice in Niger is a matter of political influence and money); Interview with an Employee
of Niger's Tax Service, supra note 130 (stating that owners of large businesses often pay no tax
and know they will be shielded from prosecution by high ranking members of their political
parties); see also Interview with a Prominent Lawyer, in Niamey, Niger (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file
with author) (claiming that everyone knows that the outcomes of investigations and trials are
routinely determined by phone calls from ministers' offices); Alou, supra note 282, at 156-60
(similar).
304. See Interview with Manager of Rental Car Business, supra note 196 (noting that
those who engage in corruption with ministry officials are protected because the officials can
simply pick up the telephone and order judges not to pursue charges).
305. See id.; see also supra notes 229 and accompanying text (discussing administrative
banishment).
306. See Johnston, supra note 235, at 64 (arguing that anti-corruption enforcement is
commonly used as a tool to attack political rivals); see also Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26,
at 7 (arguing that elites use the war against corruption to eliminate their political enemies and
settle old scores).
307. See Interview with Young Electronics Merchant, supra note 144 (stating that in
Niger, there is a widespread view that justice is for sale).
308. See id. (stating that much of the judiciary is influenced by "friends" who call in
favors).
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accused bureaucrat is not being actively punished by powerful actors
who order the judges to convict him, 3 09 he can simply pay the judges to
make the accusations and investigations go away.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In some respects this Article's contribution to the literature on
international law and development, and more specifically to the
literature on institution building and business formalization programs in
the international arena, may appear slight. Readers who skipped ahead
to the conclusion hoping to view a standard three-part solution to the
problems faced by institution building and business formalization
programs will be disappointed. The fact is, I do not know how to solve
the problems and I am not sure that anybody does. This Article's
contribution to the literature is to undertake a step that most promoters
and practitioners of international law and development projects skip:
assessing in detail the on-the-ground reality in the country whose
institutions are to be reformed to determine what institutions already
exist and how the proposed Western institutions are likely to be
received.
Interviews with the proprietors of small businesses in Niger reveal
that the promoters of business formalization in Niger are mistaken in
their assumption that the business sector, which is overwhelmingly
informal, in fact lacks predictable institutions. Concomitantly, they are
mistaken in their assumption that the introduction of new U.S.-style
legal and regulatory institutions will rapidly be embraced by Niger's
business sector.
The homegrown, durable institution already in place in Niger's
business sector-the institution that supplies the extant rules of the
game and hinders businessmen's embrace of Western-style business
laws and regulations-is corruption. United States and other
international aid organizations are, of course, well aware of corruption
in Niger and other developing countries, but they tend to portray it as an
annoyance and an inefficient drag on the system when in fact it is the
system.
Proprietors of small businesses in Niger who wish to prosper must
participate in a vast, well organized system that operates according to its
own logic and its own set of widely understood rules. Small
businessmen aspire to move up the commercial chain from retail to
wholesale by mounting international purchasing expeditions. Because
such expeditions require large amounts of capital, and because Niger's
309. See Blundo & de Sardan, supra note 26, at 7 (arguing that elites use the war against
corruption to eliminate their political enemies and settle old scores).
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financial sector cannot or will not provide it, businessmen finance their
trips by engaging in systematic corrupt purchasing transactions with the
Nigerien government, which is the largest economic actor in the
country. They also rely on corrupt transiteursto preserve the profits that
are generated by their purchasing expeditions. The transiteurs,acting as
wholesale brokers of corruption, help the businessmen by minimizing
the customs duties and taxes that the businessmen would be legally
obliged to pay on their goods, and by sweeping aside the bureaucratic
regulatory burdens that businessmen otherwise would have to grapple
with. In short, if U.S. aid organizations were to look carefully at the
institutional terrain they intend to reform, they would find that Niger's
small business sector is far from a Hobbesian struggle of all against all
and in fact is governed by rules of the game that are well understood by
all of the players.
This Article elevates corruption to the status of an important
institution in Niger's business sector, but readers should not interpret
that declaration as an endorsement. At present, corruption provides the
institutional matrix that supplies the rules of the game for Niger's
business sector, but for reasons summarized in Part IV.C, it is not an
institution that many Nigeriens would choose if there were alternatives.
Corruption greases the wheels of government and produces (and
preserves) wealth for those who engage in it, but it has terrible negative
consequences for the rest of society: public buildings that fall down,
roads that crumble, medical equipment that does not function, and
technological hardware that is hopelessly inappropriate or out of date. It
also undermines citizens' confidence in the state as government funds
are diverted to private use by businessmen and their corrupt
governmental collaborators.
If the findings of this Article are correct, and if corruption is the
fundamental institution of Niger's business sector, then the challenge
faced by U.S.-funded business formalization programs is daunting
indeed. Douglass North, who more than any other individual is
associated with New Institutionalism, states quite clearly that institutions are path dependent and generally not amenable to rapid reform.3 10
There is no doubt that corruption is well entrenched in Nigerien society,
including its business sector, and it is doubtful that it will disappear
quickly in spite of urgings and earnest attempts by the MCC and other
aid organizations.
Rather than end on that dour note, I conclude with a ray of hope.
While conducting interviews in Niger, I happened across a small
subclass of businessmen-young, relatively highly educated entrepreneurs who have been exposed to the philosophy and the lingo of
310. See North, supra note 47; see also supra text accompanying notes 50, 55.
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Western capitalist entrepreneurship-who rue the fact that the system of
corruption now in place prevents them from moving up in the market
and competing. In their view, the corrupt collaborators within the
governmental and business sectors wish to keep the system the same
because they wish to keep the spoils for themselves and block ambitious
young entrepreneurs from entering.3 1 '
Among these young entrepreneurs, the institutional reforms
proposed by the U.S.-funded aid programs-reforms that this Article
has implicitly critiqued as naYve, or at least premature-are quite
popular. They laud the idea of a one-stop shop where entrepreneurs can
quickly and cheaply accomplish all of the formalities necessary for
establishing a business; they like the idea of stimulating foreign direct
investment by rationalizing business laws and loosening restrictions on
expatriating business profits; they long for an environment in which the
financial burdens placed on businesses by government will be
inexpensive and predictable. In short, this young class of entrepreneurs
is already sold on the benefits of the institutional reform program being
promoted by the U.S. and other Western governments. Although they
are in a distinct minority, one could imagine that they could become
promoters for the reform package, and that they could help stimulate a
virtuous cycle whereby businessmen try out the new institutions, find
that they prefer their stability and predictability, and demand more. 3 12
This momentum might, just might, overcome corruption's path
dependency and begin to dislodge it from its foundational position in
Niger's businesses, government and judiciary.

311. See, e.g., Interview with a Young Hydrologist Entrepreneur, in Niamey, Niger (Mar.
5, 2009) (on file with author); Interview with Three Members of the Young Chamber, supra
note 139.
312.

ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 177, at 108.
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